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CHARACTER-EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES.
It is unfortunate that two such radically different conceptions as character and reputation should have been so far confused by juristic writers
that the former word is frequently employed in the sense of the latter, and
that with seeming unconsciousness they glide from the use of character, in
the strict sense, to its use in the sense of reputation.
Character, in a wide sense, imports the sum of the mental and corporeal qualities of a man. In a narrower sense, it signifies the moral tendencies, which evince themselves in habitual action. The tendency to speak
the truth, producing the habit of truth-telling, is a man's veracity. The
tendency to sexual continency, manifested in actual continency, is his chastity. The absence of a tendency to anger, and to the expression of anger
in word and deed, is his placableness, or patience.
The existence of these tendencies may be a cause of legal liability.
Though, for example, an employer is not ordinarily liable to a servant for
the negligence of a fellow-servant, he will be liable if the latter has the trait
of habitual carelessness, and if this trait was, or, under the circumstances,
should have been, known to the employer when he employed him, and if
this trait has led to a specific careless act which has occasioned injury.'
Sometimes the tendency itself would not be material, but only the expression of it in act. The fact that an act expressive of a certain disposition has been done may either be a cause of action for another, or constitute for that other a defence to an action brought by the doer of it. Thus,
doubtless, should A sue B for breach of promise to marry, an act of fornication with X committed after or, under circumstances, before, the contract
to marry was made, would defeat the recovery, or at least mitigate the
damages recoverable. 2 The Act of May 19, 1887,1 making carnal knowledge of a female under 16 years of age " felonious rape," directs that if
the jury shall find that she was not of good repute, and the act was with
her consent, the defendant shall be convicted of fornication only. Under
this act, not the reputation, but the character as expressed in act, is meant
The defendant can prevent a conviction of rape on
by" good repute."
showing prior acts of fornication by the prosecutrix, and her improper conduct
4
and conversation both at the time of the alleged rape and at other times.
'Frazier v. Penna. R. R. Co., 38 Pa. 104.
31 P. & L. 1318.

2Van Storch v. Griffin,
71 Pa. 240; 77 Pa. 504.
4Commonwealth v. Davis, 3 Dist. 271.
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But, while the character tendency alone, or as expressed in an act,
may affect the rights and liabilities, either of the person in whom the tendency inheres, or of others, it is capable, even when it does not itself have
these legal effects, of assisting in establishing the occurrence or non-occurrence of events, to which effects are legally annexed. In short, the character may be evidential of a relevant fact. In a prosecution of X for the
murder of Y, e. g., there are several questions: Was Y killed? Was he
killed by X? Was he killed purposely by X? Was he killed in self-defense, or unnecessarily, and wantonly? Was he killed under circumstances
that induce the law to affirm that the act was done with malice? If the act
required courage, and X was unusually timid, his timidity would be a circumstance pointing from his having committed it. If the act was in itself
or its concomitants ferocious, and X was usually gentle, tender, pitiful,
these traits would make the acceptance of X's guilt more difficult than were
he of the opposite. When a man has been honest for forty years, under
all circumstances, we expect him to be honest under circumstances similar
to these in his forty-first year, and when an act of theft or peculation is imputed to him, we find it less easy to believe the charge than if we had not
known him to have had this character.
Circumstances of endless varieties are admissible to prove or disprove
alone, or in conjunction with other circumstances, substantive facts. Amofg
these are mental states. The formation by A of a purpose to kill B is
deemed a relevant fact, when the inquiry is, did A kill B? Hence, A's
threat to kill would be evidential, more or less strongly, that, B having been
killed, A did the killing. The relevancy of a desire, or of facts which
would probably engender a desire, is universally recognized. Is the question, did A burn his barn? Then it is permissible to show that he had a
heavy insurance on it, since that fact may have kindled the wish to get the
insurance money, and the wish may have induced the volition to fire the
building.' There is a certain tendency of a wish to give birth to a will, and
of a will to give birth to an act. Hence, the relevancy of the proof of the
wish, or of the will, when the question is, did A do the act?
The persistent drifts or tides of emotion, appetite, passion, which characterize men, are equally evidential of their doing or not doing specific acts
congenial or uncongenial to them. One whose cupidity has always been
feeble, and whose respect for law has been strong, will with some difficulty
be believed guilty of a crime of which cupidity was the only instigation, be
it theft, embezzlement, robbery, burglary or murder. "Evidence of good
character," says Rice, P. J., 11 does not operate as a bar to a prosecution
[e. g., for murder]. It is not of itself a defence. It is simply an item of
evidence. The argument to be drawn from it is, that it is improbable that
' Cf. commonwealth v. Clernmer, 196 Pa. 202.

'Commonwealth v. Weathers,7 Kulp 1; Commonwealth v. Irwin, 1 cl. 329.
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a person of good character for peace and quietness would commit an act of
violence," etc.
" If you were told," observes McClure, P. J., "some one
you knew was honest had been guilty of larceny, you would be slow to believe; your belief would yield to proof, but with reluctance."'
It is evident, on the least reflection, that the evidential value of character as indicative of the doing of an act, the forming of a purpose, the being
in a given emotional state, e. g., of rage, vindictiveness, jealousy, concupiscence, does not depend on the quality imposed on the act, purpose or
mental state by the law, nor upon the ulterior legal effect contemplated by
That, e. g., A deliberately burned his barn to cheat an
the investigation.
insurer, will be rendered equally improbable by evidence of A's uniform
scrupulousness and honesty, whether the object of the investigation into his
causation of the fire is the imposition of a criminal penalty, or the prevention of his recovery of the insurance money. It is well settled, however,
that in a civil proceeding, the possession by a person of a character averse
from the act in question cannot be proven, in order to make his commission
of the act improbable. In a civil action for assault and battery, the defendant cannot prove his good character, though he might have done it had he
been prosecuted criminally for the same act,2 nor in an action by the assured, on a policy of fire insurance, the insurer defending it by evidence
that the plaintiff set fire to the building, can the latter show his good character.'
In prosecutions for all sorts of crimes, the defendant may show his
character as a means of increasing the improbability or diminishing the
probability that he is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. The
crime may be murder,4 or homicide of any grade, embracing involuntary
manslaughter.
Concerning this form of manslaughter, there is a conflict
of opinion.
In the prosecution of a man for the killing of another by the
careless running of a locomotive, McClure, P. J., of Allegheny county,
allowed the defendant to prove his trait of habitual caution, "his character
for caution." '
The same question presented itself in the prosecution of a
man for the same crime, committed in carelessly handling a revolver. The
court, Archbald, J., declined to receive evidence of the character of the
defendant as a cautious, careful and prudent man, saying that character
was receivable in "ordinary cases, because it tends to rebut criminal intent.
It accordingly varies with the character of the offence charged. But, it is
the peculiarity of involuntary manslaughter, that the killing is without criminal intent. It is always by misadventure, and is only made a crime because of being brought about by some culpable or unlawful act."
"How,"
'Commonwealth v. Kuhn:, 1 Pitts. 13.

2Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424.

'American Fire Ins. Co. v. Hazen. 110 Pa. 530.
'Snyder v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 519; Commonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64: Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 198 : Commonwealth v. Platt, 11 Phila. 415; McLain v. Commonwealth. 99 Pa. 99;
Commonwealth Y. Twitchell, 1 Brewst. 551; Commonwealth v.Miller, 4 Phila. 195; Commonwealth
v. Boschino, 170 Pa. 103; Commonwealth v. Eckerd, 174 Pa. 137.

'Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 1 Pittsb. 13.

'Commonwealth v. Blues, 1 Wilcox 39.
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asks the distinguished jurist, " can the reputation of the defendant in the
It may be
community help us to judge of the defendant's carelessness?"
enough to suggest that the cases do not confine character to disproof of
"intent" alone; and that the cruelty, or cupidity, or sexual passion, expressed by an alleged act, no more makes it refutable by a contrary character than does its carelessness or recklessness. Habitual care as readily
makes an alleged act of grave carelessness improbable as does habitual
chastity, an act of adultery, or habitual placableness and patience, an act
of cruel vindictiveness.
Besides the perpetration of homicides, that of all other kinds of crime
may be more or less fully refuted by proof of an alien character, e. g..
abortion,' forgery, 2 conspiracy to cheat and defraud, 3 burglary, 4 libel, 5 assault
and battery,' rape,' fraudulently making and altering a written instrument.'
DEFENDANT INITIATES PROOF OF CHARACTER.

It is evident that while a good character makes improbable an act not
consonant with it, a bad character lessens the improbability of an act which
accords with it. When, however, an act, e. g., of cruelty, is done, and the
question is, did A do it, the fact that A had been uniformly kind and gentle for many years more strongly persuades that he did not do it, than the
fact that he had been very often cruel persuades that he did it. That the
act was done by a cruel man is much more nearly certain, than that it was
done by a particular man who is cruel. The cruelty of the act tends to
negative the agency of a generally kind man, but it does not negative the
existence of many other cruel men than the defendant, or the agency of
some unknown one of these men. That he has the congenial trait of character does not tend to show that others have it not, and that some other,
having it, has not done the deed. It is a well established principle, therefore, that the defendant in a criminal case is permitted to prove his character in order to negative his participation in the crime, but the Commonwealth is not permitted in the first instance to show that his character is
bad, in order to diminish the jury's difficulty in concluding him to be
guilty.' This, perhaps, is an anomaly. It is permissible to the Commonwealth to show that the defendant is of the class, a member of which must
have committed the act. It can show, e. g., that he was near the place at
the time of the occurrence, and so put him in the class of the possibly
guilty. It can prove that he had an instrument, e.g., a gun, a quantity of
poison, by the like of which only the crime could have been done, in order
to put him within the comparatively small class of the possibly, or probably, guilty. Nobody poisons who does not have poison. When it is
'Commonwealth v. Gibbons, 3 Super. 408.

'Pauli v. Commonwealth. 89 Pa. 432.

'Becker v. Commonwealth, 9 Atlan. 510.
Porter v. Seller, 23 Pa. 424.

'Commonwealth v. Irwin, I CI. 329.
5'Snyder v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 519.

3Heine v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 145; Hanney v. Commonwealth, 116 Pa. 322.

'Commonwealth v. Sayars, 21 Super. 75.

Commonwealth v. Weber, 167 Pa. 153.
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proved that A had the poison, he is put into the comparatively small class
of persons, one of whom must have done the act. When the person who
did the crime is proven to have been an Italian, or to have lisped, or had
any other differentiating peculiarity, it is permitted to show that the defendant is an Italian, or lisps, or has the peculiarity. The courts, however,
will not allow evidence that A is of the cruel, or vindictive, or life-despising class-a comparatively small class-some member of which, in all
likelihood, did the deed. The justification for the exclusion is stated by
Greenleaf to be "that such evidence is too likely to move the jury to condemnation, irrespective of his actual guilt of the offense charged." 1 We
shall show later, that after the defendant has ventured on proving his good
character, it is open to the prosecution to refute the evidence. Only in
attempting such refutation can the character of the accused be assailed by
the Commonwealth.
THE RELEVANT SPECIES OF CHARACTER.

The so-called character of man is composite. The word is a general
term for a variety of drifts or tendencies; for various classes of appetites or
emotions, and.modes of thought and action. These elements do not always
co-exist, or co-exist in the same proportion. A man may be truthful, and
chaste, and unavaricious, and unirascible; he may be truthful, but unchaste, avaricious, irascible; or truthful and chaste, but avaricious and
irascible. Proof of the habitual truthfulness of the defendant might be
relevant, were the question did he, on a given occasion, commit perjury,
while irrelevant, if the question were, did he kill or commit adultery. Probity could be shown, as Bell, P. J., suggests2 when the question is concerning a dishonest act; or humanity when the inquiry concerns a cruel act, or
violent act; or loyalty when the inquiry is about a seditious libel containing treasonable matter. But the indictment being for making a libel against
a private individual, it is irrelevant to inquire what the character of the accused is as a "peaceable and orderly man." 3 The defendant being on trial
for the murder of his wife, the court rejected an offer to prove that he
"always had been known and reputed among his neighbors as a kindhearted man."
It accompanied the rejection with the "permission to show
the character of the defendant for peaceableness and regularity of conduct,
and of good feeling toward the deceased, or in any other respect which
had a proper relation to the subject matter of the prosecution."
For the
Supreme Court, Strong, J., says, " We cannot say that here was error;"
but he may have meant, without approving of it, that no harm could have
been done by the trial court's distinction.4 On trials for murder, it is rele'Evidence. p. 39, 16th Ed., Boston. This is not the only rule based on the assumption of the fatuousness of juries.
2Commonwealth v. Irwin, 1 Cl. 344.
'Commonwealth v. Irwin, 1 CI. 344. Having excluded the question, the court refused a new trial.
4Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 103. In Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 1 Brewst. 551, the court ex-

cluded evidence of the defendant's "mild and pacific habits." It was stated that defendant might
sbow his general character for peace, humanity, honesty and regularity of conduct.
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vant to show that the character of the defendant was that of a "peaceable
and inoffensive" person, 1 or of a man of "peace and good conduct," 2 or
"of a peaceable and law-abiding citizen, a good and orderly man." 3 On
trials for conspiracy to cheat, the relevant character is honesty ;4 for abortion, apparently, that of being a " peaceable and law-abiding citizen;"'
for burglary, that of being an honest man ;6 for assault and battery, that of
being peaceable and orderly; 7 for involuntary manslaughter, through an act
of negligence, that of being a careful man ;' for rape, that of being chaste.'
Duckworth having been convicted of assault and battery with intent to commit rape, after his own testimony followed by that of witnesses who proved
his bad character for truth, he alleged as cause for a new trial that this impeachment of his veracity tended to unfairly prejudice the jury against him.
Yerkes, P. J., refusing the new trial, says " it is settled that in each case
the character sought to be proved must not be general, but such as would
apply to the particular crime with which the defendant is charged. Proof
that a man is dishonest or untruthful by character will not be evidence to
show that he committed a murder or rape."'" It may be worth while in
passing to heed a remark of Pearson, P. J., in a murder case,' in which apparently the question, " What was the defendant's general character for
kindness and humanity?" had been excluded. The judge notes the omission to inquire for the " general good moral character" of the prisoner,
and remarks: "It is pretty clear that it was not legal evidence," referring
to Cathcart v. Commonwealth, supra. That case can scarcely be deemed
authority for the practice intimated, and it would be unphilosophical to prefer an inquiry into the " general good moral character" to one into the
character for some attributes more specifically involved in murder or abstinence from murder, in rape or abstinence from rape, in theft or abstinence
from theft, etc. It may be noted that sometimes several traits of character converge on the alleged crime. To commit rape would imply not
only unchastity, but violence and cruelty, and a good character for chastity
or for peaceableness would be relevant.
WHAT CHARACTER MAY BE USED TO NEGATIVE THE CRIME.

Crimes are often composite. Murder of the first degree includes the
death of a man by the agency of another, with the intention to kill, or the
attempt to commit one of several felonies, and with malice. It might be
that the accused admitted the killing, but denied -the intention, or the attempt to commit a felony, or the malice. The admission of the killing
'Commonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64; Commonwealth v. Eckerd, 174 Pa. 137; Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 198.

-McLain v. Commonwealth. 99 Pa. 86. In trial for homicide, defendant's -good. character for honesty,
peace and quiet was received.

'Commonwealth v. Harmon, 199 Pa. 521.

'Hanney v. Commonwealth, 116 Pa. 322; Heine v. Commonwealth. 91 Pa. 145.
'Becker v. Commonwealth, 9 Atlan. 510.

'Commonwealth v. Gibbons, 3 Super. 408.
,Porter v. Seller, 23 Pa. 424.

'Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 1 Pittsb. 13; Cf. Commonwealth v. Bloes, 1 Wilcox 39.

'Commonwealth v. Brubaker, 13 Super. 14.
"0Commonwealth v. Duckworth, 2 Pa. C. C. 443. Proof of honesty or truthfulness would not tend to

show non-commission of a murder or rape.

"Commonwealth v. Shaffner, 2 Pears. 450.
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would not preclude his use of his good character to refute the charge of intention, or malice, and so to acquit him of the highest degree of murder.
In Commonwealth v. Cleary,1 Cleary was indicted for murdering a policeman, by shooting. He substantially admitted the shooting, but denied the
intent to kill, and also malice. The evidence indicated that he had been
intoxicated. The trial court, Mayer, P. J., was of the opinion that, as the
defendant's commission of the crime was not disputed, and the only question was the grade or degree of the crime, and as the determination of that
question depended on the mental condition of the defendant, whether intoxicated or not, the evidence of good character " had little relevancy."
This view was deemed erroneous by the Superior -Court. The jury found
that the prisoner was not so far intoxicated as to be unable to form the willful, deliberate and premeditated intent to take the life of the deceased.
The question then was, did he in fact form this intent? " Just here," says
Paxson, C. J., "is the place where the evidence- of good character was
entitled to come in, and have its due weight. Here was his supreme peril.
The defence of intoxication had failed. If a man's good character is to
avail him at all, when does he need it more than when a jury is deliberating upon the question whether he had formed ,in his mind the deliberate
It is quite clear that if the good character
intent to take a human life?"
of the accused tends to negative the presence in him or his conduct of any
element of the crime charged, whether it be the doing of the outward act,
or his knowledge of certain facts, or his intention to produce the actual result, or his cast of emotion and thought, vaguely termed malice, it would
be illogical to allow it to disprove some only of these ingredients.

How CHARACTER IS TO BE PROVEN.
The mental drifts of a human being are revealed to himself only by
the thoughts, feelings and volitions which they cast into his consciousness.
No other human being can know them, except from his observation of their
effects in words and acts. That A is kind can be known to B only by B's
having watched him in a variety of circumstances, and seen how he has
acted towards other sentient beings within his reach; or by his having
learned this conduct from one who has thus observed. The tendencies
which are secluded in a piece of iron are detected by observation of its behavior in a variety of conditions. No other method discovers the properties of a man. If, then, the question is, is A a chaste man, how is it to
be answered but by learning what his words and acts are. If the question
is, is he honest, the answer must come from observing how he acts respect1135 Pa. 64.

In.Commonwealth v. Kolb, 13 Super. 347, where Kolb was indicted for selling as but-

ter oleomargarine, Smith, .. , says: "The good character of the defendant had no possible bearing on

this point, nor could it create adoubt respecting the conceded fact of sale," and the omission to instruct as to the value of the good character evidence, the court not having been requested to give into be
error.
But if the goodit character
ofondefendant
hadwhether
no bearing
on the
structions,
was held
question
whether
thenot
thing
sold
was oleomargarine,
had bearing
the question
he believed

it to be oleomargarine.

H is belief may have had bearing on the fact.
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ing the property of others, his contracts with them, etc. If he is always
careful to pay what he owes, if he never seeks to deceive or defraud, if he
never appropriates that which is another's, he will be inferred to be honest.
It may be proper here to observe that if character is used in the sense
of conduct, then to affirm a chaste character of a man would be to affirm
chaste conduct. Conduct is a series of acts; and the only way to know
that the conduct of one is chaste is to know at least so large a proportion
of his acts to be chaste that the rest may be deemed exceptional and uncharacteristic. If by character is meant the sub-conscious streams of tendency, it can be known only by the perception of their manifestations, the
words, attitudes, deeds, to which they give rise.
A conceivable way, therefore, of establishing a defendant's character
would be the testimony of persons who knew him, to his specific acts, or to
so many of them as might be deemed decisive of tendency. Another conceivable method would be to allow those who had acquaintance with his
conduct to state the impressions left on their minds as to his traits: his
quietness, submissiveness to law, unselfishness, kindness, etc. Neither of
these is the adopted method. Specific good acts, however striking and
characteristic, cannot be proven by the defendant. The objection to this
mode of proof is similar to that which is suggested by Mitchell, J., then in
the Common Pleas of Philadelphia, to the proof of the character of the deceased in a murder case. "Evidence of a specific act is not admissible.
It would lead to a collateral inquiry, into which we could not enter, to wit:
the circumstances of that case. Nothing could be more unfair ihan to give
in evidence a single act as proof of a brutal and dangerous disposition,
without inquiring into all the circumstances of that act.
*
* This
would be impossible, and without it, the evidence of a specific act would
be worse than useless; it would be dangerous."' This, the most scientific
method, is for the courts impracticable. Therefore, a less trustworthy
method must be adopted.
But little trace, if any, of an attempt to prove a defendant's character
by the summarized impressions of those who have known him, is to be
found in the Pennsylvania reports. 2 It is not clear that this would not be a
feasible method, nor that it would not be more reliable and satisfactory
than the method actually in vogue. " The most natural way to learn what
disposition to truth-telling is possessed by a witness, would be," says Prof.
Wigmore, 3 "to receive the estimates of those who are personally and intimately acquainted with him, and 'have had ample opportunity to learn his
character; and such was the original and orthodox practice, both in England and in this country. Such continues to be the rule in England."
As
'Commonwealth v. Richmond, 6 W. N. C. 431;" Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. 1; Cf. Shaffner V.

Commonwealth, 72 Pa. 60, where there is a discussion of the proof of onecrimeby means of proving
another.
-1Men who knew the defendant well,seem to have testified from that knowledge to his chastity in Commonwealth v. Brubaker, 13 Super. 14.
'Greenleaf 'sEvidence, p. 582, 16th Ed., Boston.
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the veraciousness of a man can be discovered best by those who are acquainted with him, so can any other personal quality. For some reason,
not at all satisfactory,, this testimony of those who know the man, is not
receivable as to his traits.
The specific acts of a man cannot be proved in order that the jury may
induct from them his character. The inductions of witnesses who have
observed his acts, and are competent to make and report inductions from
them, cannot be heard from the witnesses themselves. How, then, can
the character of a defendant be shown? Only in one way, viz: by his
reputation. The objections to this vehicle of proof are striking. The reputation, if well grounded, emanates from those who have seen the specific
acts, and have reported them, or from those who have seen these acts, have
generalized and inducted character from them, and have stated their generalizations and inductions. The witness who testifies to reputation testifies, in substance, that he has heard A, and B, and C, and D, and twenty
or forty others, say that the accused was this or that sort of a man. The
witness may or may not correctly represent what he has heard from others.
These others may have repeated only what still others had told them, and
these may not have correctly reported what tl~ey heard. But, the value
of the original reporter would depend on his being an observer of an adequate number of the acts of the defendant, and on his properly inducting
character from them. If these observers were before the court, the content
and the value of their opinions could be more surely learned, than when,
invisible themselves, their identities even being unascertained, reports at first,
second, tenth, nay, so far as can be known, at thousandth hand, of what
they have said, are the only evidence of their opinions.
The propriety of receiving reputation, so far as it is composed of the
opinions of non-observers, rests on the unverifiable assumption that this
reputation will faithfully represent the opinions of the observers. This assumption is not only unprovable, but improbable. It is true that, Lowrie,
C. J.,1 remarks, - there is no danger of any person having a better reputation in ordinary conduct than he deserves," a dictum which could be
justified only by an investigation of a very large number of reputations, and
of the conduct of the persons affected by them, for such things are not selfevident. We are not aware that any sociological students have conducted
such investigations. Socrates was believed at Athens to be a much worse
man than he was, and prophets are without honor where they ought to be
best known. It is quite as easy to think that a reputation may be better
than is deserved as that it may be worse. It would be a miracle if, in a
large percentage of cases, the reputation exactly corresponded with the
facts of conduct and character. The annals of crime not infrequently exhibit shocking and startling discrepancies between the good repute of men
'Hoffman v. Kemerer, 44 Pa. 452.
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and what the evidence shows to have been their actual character. It is to
exceed the truth to say, as does Woodward, J.,1 that "character or reputation is generally regarded as the voice of the community, but that isjust
what the conduct of the individual makes it," and that to prove the " speech
of the people," i. e., reputation is the same thing as to prove the " genAn active, virulent and skillful enemy can
eral tenor of the conduct."
give a good man a bad name in a community, and it not seldom happens
that the character of a man with influential, social connections, passes for
much better than it really is. But, whatever may be the justification of
assuming that, in the long run, reputation will correspond with the conduct
of the subject, so far as it is visible to observers, there is scarcely a word
to be said in favor of employing the reputation as the evidence of the tenor
of conduct, to the exclusion of the judgments of those who know the party
whose conduct or character is in question.
It is well established, however, in Pennsylvania, that the good character of the accused in a criminal case is to be proven, if at all, neither by
proof of specific acts, however numerous and significant, 2 nor by.the testimony of those who knew him well, to their inductions from their observations, but solely by proof of reputation. It is presumed that when a man
is reputed to be chaste, or honest, or gentle, he has been chaste, honest or
gentle, and the currency of the reputation is the only evidence of the conduct and of the implied character.
REBUTTING EVIDENCE OF GOOD REPUTATION.
It has been remarked that the defendant in a criminal case must initiate the investigation into his character. He is interested in showing that
it is good, not bad. 3 The Commonwealth may refute this evidence, 4 not
merely by the cross-examination of the witnesses who give it, and the eliciting, by means of it, of the baselessness of what they testify, but also by other
witnesses 'who testify to the bad reputation of the accused. Possibly the
prisoner's witness may be cross-examined as to whether he has heard of
some specific misconduct, or of some event (e. g., confinement in jail, penitentiary or house of reform), which may indicate an offence.' It is not
permitted to the Commonwealth, however, to call witnesses to prove a specific bad act. The trial being for murder, the good character evidence
'Zitzer v. Merkel, 24 Pa. 408. The action for slander or libel presupposes that the reputation of a

man may be worse than he deserves. The many cases in which men have been convicted of heinous
crimes, who have been proven to have fair reputations, suggest the disparity between reputation and
actual character, if not between the former and actual conduct.
'So the truthfulness of a witness cannot be shown by specific acts, but only by reputation. The
vitness must know the reputation, and not the facts which justify it. Kimmei v, Kimmel, 3 S. & R.

336.

'The prisoner may prove or admit a bad act. If hedoes, the Commonwealth can make use of it to

his detriment, and the judge may direct the .jury's attention to it. Commonwealth v Boscherio, 176
Pa. 103. In Commonwealth v. Petroff, 2 Pears. 534, Petroff was -on trial for corrupt solicitation of a
member of the Legislature to vote for a bill. Apparently as a witness, Petroff spoke of having been

in trouble before in matters connected with the Legislature. The court admonished the jury to pay
Itoattention to that admission, saying "there is no bad character proved, and, therefore, we are to try
h im the same as though he had not used that expression."
-Blackburn v. Holliday, 12 S. & R. 140; Commonwealth v. Weber, 167 Pa. 153.

$Abernethy v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa.22. The defendant's witness admitted on cross-examination,

that he had heard that the defendant had been, when a boy, in the house of reform.
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cannot be met, e. g., by proof that the defendant committed a rape,' or was
guilty of particular acts of cruelty towards his children.' The defendant,
says the court, foreseeing that he will be thus charged, will not have prepared a defense against the charge; and the jury might reason, that if he
was bad enough to commit rape, he was bad enough to commit murder.
Concede that the first of these reasons is sound, yet the only object of allowing the rebutting evidence as to character is to show that it is bad, in
order that the jury may draw what inferences they will from it. It has
never been laid down in this State that the jury must consider the rebutting
character evidence as simply neutralizing that of the prisoner. If, then,
the jury may infer from the defendant's bad character for chastity that he
not unlikely committed the adultery for which he is being tried, why can
they not be allowed to infer from some specific unchaste act that he has not
unlikely committed the adultery? The objection is plainly not to the inference, but to the premiss.
SECOND OFFENCES.
When the law increases the punishment of a second offence, the Commonwealth, if it desires to impose the heavier punishment, must both allege
in the indictment, and prove that it is a second offence.' And in this case
the Commonwealth proves the previous bad act, without any previous evidence from the defendant of his good character, and although the evidence
4
of the former act may predispose the jury to believe his guilt of the second.
NATURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH'S EVIDENCE.

The Commonwealth encounters the defendant's evidence of good character by evidence of his bad character, but, as his evidence must be of a
character germane to the offence-of chastity, e. g., if the offence charged
is adultery or fornication; of peaceableness, if the offence is assault and
battery; so the rebutting -evidence must be of the relevant sub-division of
character. In the trial of a man for forgery, certain witnesses for the
Commonwealth testified that they had heard it alleged that he was a bad
man. "General evidence," says Paxson, J., "that a defendant is a bad
man is not admissible in any civilized country upon the trial for forgery,
by any recognized rule of evidence."' But how specialized must the character be, proof of which may be made? In a murder case, the evidence
of defendant's good character was met by proof of complaints by his chil'Snyder v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 519.

The accused was charged with the murder of the child of

his own daughter, of whom he was alleged to be the father. The principal witness was the daughter.
To weaken her testimony, It was shown that three complaints had been made against him, one for incestuous adultery and one for incestuous rape, and later the present charge of murder. The object of
showing these charges was to suggest the improbability that, knowing that he was guilty of murder, the daughter would have at any time contented herself with making the less grave charges. Even
under such circumstances, the daughter could not be allowed to prove that the rape actually occurred.
2Snyder v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 519. The Commonwealth proved "complaints by the children of
his cruelty towards them."
'Rauch v. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. 490; Smith v. Commonwealth, 16 S. & R. 69; Kane v. Common-

wealth, 109 Pa. 5'1.
'Kane v. Commonwealth, 109 Pa. 541.
'Pdnll v. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 432. It is not clear whether, in the opinion of Paxson, J., the error
was In the fact that to testify to having heard the allegation was not'to testify to a reputation, or in the
content of the allegation.
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dren, of his cruelty towards them, but apparently the objection to the evidence
was not that it related to cruelty, but that it related to specific instances of
cruelty, and that these instances were to be established by the declarations
of those who had witnessed and suffered them, and not by reputation.'
If a man commits a conspicuous act of a certain sort, even once, he
may acquire the reputation of having done it, e.g., of having murdered X.
To prove the murder by means of the reputation would be open to two objections: that it is the use of a single bad act, to impeach the defendant's
character; and that it is unreliable, as a reputation which is not founded
on the separate observations by different observers of many acts of the
same sort, but on the single observation by one or two persons of one act
only. But the accused may have the reputation of doing often a particular
kind of act, e.g., of committing abortion.
Can the doing of several of
these acts be proven by means of the reputation of having done them in
answer to the defendant's proof of good character?
In Commonwealth v.
Gibbons,' the accused, tried for abortion, gave evidence of his good reputation as a peaceable, law-abiding citizen. Witnesses for the Commonwealth stated that his reputation as a peaceable and law-abiding citizen was
"bad," or " not above reproach."
They were then allowed to answer
affirmatively the questions, " Have you heard general talk tothe effect that
he has been practicing abortion in the neighborhood? Is not the general
reputation in that neighborhood that he is an abortionist? Has there not
been considerable talk for the last number of years connecting Dr. Gibbons
with the crime of abortion?" This, says Orlady, J., was a collateral attack, which could not be expected nor defended against. It was showing
guilt of other crimes of the same class as that for which the defendant was
on trial, and showing it would "prompt a more ready belief that he might
have committed the one with which he is charged."
But, the object of
showing a bad reputation is always to make more easy the belief of guilt
of the crime which is the subject of the trial. Is it, then, the objection,
that the evidence is too persuasive? Must the Commonwealth indulge in
only weak evidence of this sort, but eschew the strong? Whether the
"collateral attack" could be "expected" or not depends on the rule of law.
The defendant put in evidence, in an abortion case, his own character. If
the law allowed the Commonwealth, under those circumstances, to rebut
with evidence of a bad reputation for law-disobeying, or, more specifically, for anti-abortion-law-disobeying, he was bound to know it.
He
then had the option to refrain from putting his character in evidence, or of
taking the risk of proof of a reputation for violating the abortion law.
Perhaps the real objection to such evidence would he that, so far as appears, the reputation grew out of one or two occurrences only, and to receive proof of it was virtually to receive proof in a questionable form of
'Snyder v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 519.

23 Super. 408.
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specific acts. The narrower the class of acts, the fewer the acts subsumed
under it. Would it be permissible to show, on a trial for theft, a reputation for stealing; or on a trial for robbery, a reputation for robbing; or
on a trial for murder, a reputation for killing; or on a trial for adultery, a
reputation for adulterous acts? Possibly not. But the objections, if there
be any, would seem to be that the sub-division of character is too minute
to allow the supposableness of many separate acts in any one of them, and
to guarantee that the reputation should have as foundation a considerable
number of independent observations by a corresponding number of observers, and not rest on the credit of one or two persons, and involve an
induction from too small a number of cases. It is clear that between blending all sorts of character into one class, and inquiring for it, and splitting
this class up into as many sections as there are sets of acts, and inquiring
for them, there is a permissible and obligatory medium. The character
must be of a class not so wide as to be relevant in all sorts of cases, nor so
narrow (possibly) as to be relevant only in the sub-class to which the crime
charged belongs; but criteria for defining the degree of generality, or speciality, cannot be discovered in the cases.
It need scarcely be said that the kind of bad character shown must
be germane to the offence which is the theme of investigation. Proof that
a man is reputed dishonest or untruthful would not be admissible were he
on trial for rape or murder.'
As the defendant must show his good character by his reputation for
such character, so the Commonwealth must show the bad character by the
reputation for it. " Character," said Mercur, J., "can be impeached only
by evidence of general reputation, and not by evidence of particular acts
of misconduct. It should be what people ingeneral say, and not what
others [i. e., a few people] say." 2 Proof of complaints of the defendant's
children, that he had treated them cruelly, would not be proof of such a
reputation.
DEFENDANT'S SUR-REBUTTAL.
If the Commonwealth has, by the cross-examination of the defendant's witness to character, disclosed the fact that, when a lad, the defendant had been in a reform school, he may call witnesses to show that he had
not been sent there because of any bad act, but for the purpose of securing
his maintenance and education, in the absence of support from the father.
It is competent for him "to brush away such a cloud upon his character,"
though he might have objected, but did not, to the cross-examination which
educed the fact of being in the school. 3 But if the confinement in a reform
school, or jail, or penitentiary, had been the result of a conviction of an
'Commonwealth v. Duckworth, 2 Pa. C. C. 443.
Snyder v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 519; Cf. Wike v. LIghtner, 11 S. & R. 198.
'Abernethy v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 322.
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offence by a court having jurisdiction, the defendant would probably not be
allowed to prove that he had been nevertheless innocent, or that the conviction had been procured by improper conduct on the part of witnesses,
jurors or others.
FAILURE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER.
The law presumes the innocence of the accused until his guilt is proved.
He is not bound to rebut incriminating evidence by the evidence of his
character, and if he does not, no inference that his character is bad can be
drawn by the jury from that fact. Nor will it be proper for the counsel
-for the prosecution to call the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to
furnish evidence of character. "Until they (prisoners) raise the question
of previous character," says Dean, J., "the Commonwealth cannot, either
by evidence or argument."'
VALUE OF GOOD-CHARACTER EVIDENCE.
In Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 2 a trial for murder, Ludlow, J., had
told the jury with respect to the Iralue of character evidence: "The rule of
law in this State, however, permits evidence of good character to be submitted to the jury in every case of homicide, no matter what may be the
other testimony in the cause. But when a doubt suggests itself to your
minds as to the prisoner's guilt, upon the facts of the case as presented by
the evidence, the law casts the whole weight of the prisoner's former good
character in mercy's scale, and settles the question in favor of the accused,"
and had added words showing that by doubt was meant a " reasonable
doubt."
These words were to be deprecated, because they were not accurate, and because there was a mischievous implication in them. It was
not correct to, say that the law casts the whole weight of character evidence
in mercy's scale. There was no question of mercy, but of fact. Did the
accused do the act? was the theme of investigation. The law does not settle the question in favor of the accused. The evidence is addressed io the
jury, and there is no rule of law susceptible of formulation which would
impose on the jury the duty of acquittal when that duty would not exist,
independently of the character evidence. The words had a mischievous
implication, because the natural inference from them of an ordinary juror
would be that the law casts into the scale, etc., only when a "doubt," that
is, a reasonable doubt, has arisen from the other evidence. The judgmefit
of conviction was nevertheless affirmed, the Supreme Court convincing itself
that the court below had "by no means confined the jury to attaching importance to the evidence only in cases of reasonable doubt."
" On the
'Commonwealth v. Weber, 167Pa. 153. "That man," meaning the prisoner, the private counsel for
the Commonwealth had said to the jury, "to-day under trial for his life, has not a single dog to bark
his praise-characterless, homeless and soulless, you have done this deed, and put your poor wretched
self in the position you are. God have mercy on your soul, for I pity you !! i" But, as no objection
was made at the time these remarks were not ground for reversing the conviction.
131 Pa. 198.
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contrary," says the court, "it left them at liberty to make it a basis forthe
formation of a doubt."' More clearly did Brewster, J.,2 apprehend the
value of character evidence when he stated to the jury: " Good character
may, in some cases, be the only defence upon which a man can rely, and
may be of itself sufficient not only to raise a doubt of guilt, but a certainty
of innocence. In other cases it may turn the trembling scale in favor of
the defendant, and in still other cases it may be entitled to no weight whatever. Its force is to be decided by the jury according to the circumstances
It is clearly erroneous to use such language to
of each particular case."
the jury as would lead them to infer that only when the other evidence
would leave a reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt might they attach
importance to the good character evidence. When the other evidence
would leave the jury in a reasonable doubt, the jury should acquit, even
were there no characte r evidence, and the instruction would, therefore,
make that evidence of no value.' And, when there is no doubt of the prisoner's guilt of some degree of the crime of which he is accused, but the
question is of which degree of it is he guilty, the character evidence may
properly decide the jury in favor of the lower degree, when, without it, it
would be wholly convinced of the guilt of the higher degree.4 It is proper,
therefore, to let the jury understand that the character evidence is to be
considered as any other evidence, and that, if thus considered, it engenders a reasonable doubt, which, did it not exist, would not arise, the prisoner must be acquitted. 5 On the other hand, it is permissible to point the
attention of the jury to the fact that men of the best reputation may commit crime, and to inform them that when, despite the evidence of good
character, they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime has
been committed by the accused, they may and should find him guilty; 6 or,
in an involuntary homicide case to say, that if a want of ordinary care
clearly appears from the evidence, they should convict, notwithstanding
the good reputation for care of the defendant.'

'In Commonwealth v. Miller, 4 Phila. 195 Judge Ludlow repeated substantially what he had said

in Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, but added: 'So, also, evidence of character way, of itself, raise a
doubt which will produce an acquittal."
also, Judge Handley's instructions in Commonwealth
'Commonwealth v. Carey, 2Brewst. 404; Cf.,
v. Bargar,2 Law Times (U. S.) 237. In Commonwealth v. Sayers, 21 Super. 75, the instruction of the
court was found self-contradictory, and, for that reason, erroneous.
3Heine v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 145; Hanney v. Commonwealth, 116 Pa. 322; Commonwealth v.
Cleary, 135 Pa. 64. In the first of these casesthe court had said: "If a man is guilty, his previous good
character has nothinIT to do with the case; but if you have doubt as to his guilt, then character steps
in and aids in determining that doubt "as if that doubt needed determination in favor of the prisoner!
In the second case, the court said: "If you think the Commonwealth has made out but a weak case,
that, whilst possibly it might be sufficient for conviction, still the case is a weak one, there the testimony as to his good character ought to weigh with you with strength sufficient to raise a reasonable

doubt in his favor, which reasonable doubt would enure to his acquittal;" that is, if there is a doubt of
guilt, but the jury is unable to say whether it should reasonably require an acquittal, the character
evidence should deepen that doubt to the degree of reasonableness! In the third case, the court told

thejury that "good character is always of importance," but was reversed because it added, "and may
turn the scale where there is a reasonable doubt as to the degree or grade of the crime."
4Commonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64. Briggs, J., on a motion for a new trial, thought the exceptional reputation of the prisoner for peace and order negatived an intent to kill. Commonwealth v.

Platt. 11 Phila. 421.
'Commonwealth v. Weathers, 7 Kulp 1; Commonwealth v. Miller, 4 Phila. 195.
'Commonwealth v. Eckerd, 174 Pa. 137; Becker v. Commonwealth, 9 Atlan. 510; Commonwealth v.

Harmon, 199 Pa. 521; McLain v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 86.
7Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 1 Pittsb. 13.
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DISTINGUISHING THE VALUES OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE.

Character evidence, like other, is susceptible of degrees. The wideness of the reputation will, unconsciously, be judged by the number of
witnesses who testify to it, and the character itself, to which the reputation
bears witness, may be of different degrees. A man may be reputed to be
of the average honesty, or exceptionally and extraordinarily honest; of
ordinary kindness, or of peculiar and unusual kindness, etc. 1 The evidence
of character is therefore of different weights in different cases. There was
cited, in McLain v. Commonwealth,' a dictum of C. i. Shaw, in the
Webster case, that "Where it is a question of great and atrocious criminality, the commission of the act is so unusual, so out of the ordinary course
of things, and beyond common experience, it is so manifest that the offence,
if perpetrated, must have been influenced by motives not frequently operating on the human mind, that evidence of character, and of a man's habitual
conduct under common circumstances, must be considered far inferior to
what it is in the instance of accusations of a lower grade." Neither dissenting from this distinction, nor adopting it, Mercur, J., thought that
qualified by the statement of the trial judge, that there may be cases in
which the character evidence would itself produce a reasonable doubt where,
without it, this would not exist, the quotation before the jury from C. J.
Shaw could have done no harm. But is it true that the more wicked and
atrocious the crime the less the value of character evidence? Must one
accused of murder count less on his excellent character than one accused
of a petty theft, or of an unimportant libel? Great and atrocious crimes
do not spring out of motives "not frequently operating on the human
mind."
It is not the motive, but the degree of it, if anything, that is unusual, while the antagonistic elements of character are weaker than usual.
But is it not as improbable that a man so uniformly kind as to have acquired the reputation of being kind will not commit an unusually cruel act,
as that he will not commit a usually cruel one?
CHARACTER OF DECEASED.

In homicide cases, and cases of serious assault, the character of the
deceased is generally irrelevant. His bad character cannot excuse the assault on him. Society has not appointed anybody who chooses, to be the
executioner of the most dangerous outlaw. 3 It is only when the defendant,
conceding the assault or killing, avers that it was done in self-defence, that
the character of the dead man can be shown, as giving probability to the
defendant's necessity under the proven circumstances to inflict the wound
-In Commonwealth v. Platt, 11 Phila. 421, Briggs, J., found the reputation of the prisoner for peace
and good order to be so "exceptional," as to satisfy him that the prisoner did not premeditately intend to kl.
299

Pa. 80.

3Commonwealth v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. 386; Commonwealth v. Kern, 1 Brewst. 350; Commonwealth T.
Flanigan, 8 Phila. 304.
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which has produced death, or grave bodily harm. Hence, on the trial of
A for the murder of B, not in self-defence, the court properly excludes evidence of B's bad "-fdeportment, when he came from the army, towards his
family."' The deceased being shown to have been drunk when the fatal
wound was inflicted, but no evidence of the defendant's having acted in
self-defence being given, the latter will not be permitted to prove that the
character of the former for peace and quiet when drunk was bad.' When
the facts proven show that there was no self-defence, that the fight between the deceased and the defendant was over, that the former was fleeing and the latter pursuing him when the former was shot by the latter, selfdefence is negatived, and evidence of the character of the deceased is
irrelevant.' In a case in which the defendant assailed X, shooting at him,
and X, in great peril, jumped at and clutched the defendant, and during
the scuffle which ensued the defendant's pistol, as he fell to the ground or
while he was on the ground, was, apparently without his intention, discharged a second time, killing a boy, the first evidence offered by the defence was that concerning the generally ruffianly conduct of X. It was
excluded. The conflict had been begun by the attempt of the defendant
to kill or grievously wound X, who was not shown to be armed, Or to have
threatened the defendant, or to have had superior physical strength. Nor
was it shown that the defendant was a man of great timidity.4 If the accused denies that he inflicted the fatal blow, e. g., a stab, the evidence
that the deceased was of quarrelsome nature, was feared in the neighborhood as a person of dangerous character, and had on several occasions
threatened to shoot and kill people, is properly excluded.'
SOME EVIDENCE OF SELF-DEFENCE.
There must, therefore, be not merely the allegation, but evidence, by
the defendant that he acted in self-defence. He may then show that the
character of the attack upon him was such that resort to the blow, shot, or
other means employed, was so apparently necessary as to be excusable.
Yet it does not seem that this evidence need be very strong. When, for
example, it was shown that the prisoner and the deceased had been intimate, that the latter assaulted and possibly struck the former, whereupon
the former pulled out his revolver and shot the latter dead, the court said
that evidence that the latter was a man of quarrelsome disposition should
have been received "as evidence that the defendant may have considered
himself as in some danger, and had resort to the weapon, not to kill but
disable his assailant."'
'Commonwealth v. Ferrigan. 44 Pa. 386.

:Commonwealth v. Kern, I Brewst. 350.
'Commonwealth v. Lenox, 3 Brewst. 249.
4Commonwjealth v. Flanigan, 8 Phila. 430.
.Commonwealth v. Straesser, 153 Pa. 451.
GAbernethy v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 322. In Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. 1, with some
doubt as to the sufficiency of proof that the deceased had assaulted the defendant," the court admitted
evidence of the character of the deceased.
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THE NATURE OF THE CHARACTER.
The object of the evidence of the character of the deceased is to make
it appear that the defendant-may have believed resort to the shot or blow
necessary in order to avert grave bodily harm or death in consequence of
the aggression of the deceased. The object is to learn the state of mind,
the fear, the apprehension, the anticipation of the prisoner at the time.
Hence, the apparent ability of the deceased to inflict grave harm is a relevant topic of inquiry. This ability may consist of his being physically
strong and supple, his height, his weight, his size, in comparison with the
prisoner.' The threat of the deceased to kill the prisoner, or inflict grave
harm on him, if known to him, would affect his view of the purpose and
probable effect of the aggression of the deceased. The proof of threat
would be relevant.' The threat, if not known to the prisoner, could not have
produced any effect on his mind. It might, nevertheless, be evidence of the
actual purpose of the deceased, and therefore, of his probable aggression, and
of the menacingness of his assault.' The ferocity, brutality, desperateness of
the deceased towards those with whom he quarreled, if known to the accused, would affect his fear and his belief as to the necessity of using ex"The prisoner's bonafide
treme expedients against his antagonist.
belief," says Mitchell, J., "that he was at the time in peril of life or great
bodily injury, being the criterion by which his act must be judged, it is
clear that such belief must have been -largely influenced by his estimate of
the character as well as the strength of the deceased." 4 Hence, it is relevant to show, when the defence is self-defence, the " quarrelsome disposition and desperate character" of the deceased, 5 his bad "character for peace
and quiet, " 6 for " general ruffianly character, "7 for "such violence, or
ferocity, or brutality of temper as would make danger to life or great bodily
injury probable,"18 for "being a quarrelsome, bad-tempered, dangerous
man," 9 for "brutality and ferocity when intoxicated," the evidence showing that the deceased was intoxicated,1" for "brutality, vindictiveness, and
violence."'" As has been intimated, the character of the deceased could not
have influenced the defendant had he not known it. Proof must be given,
therefore, that he knew it." Such proof is not given when the defendant
states, as a witness, that the deceased had pointed a revolver at a man with
'Commonwealth v. Weathers, 7 Kutlp 1; Commonwealth v. Flanigan, 8 Phila. 430; Commonwealth
v. Richmond, 6 W. N. C. 431; Alexander v. Commonwealth. 105 Pa. 1.
2Commonwealth v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. 386; Commonwealth v. Lenox. 3 Brewst. 249.

.Commonwealth v. Keller, 191 Pa. 122.

.Commonwealth v. Richmond, 6 W. N. C. 431.
'Abernethy v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 322.
'Commonwealth v. Bartian, cited by Brewster, J.; Commonwealth v. Flanigan, 8 Phila. 430; Commonwealth v. Seibert, cited; Wharton. Homicide, 8 Phila. 431.
7Probably, Commonwealth v. Flanigan, 8 Phila. 430.
OCommonwealth v. Richmond, 6 W. N.C. 431. Mitchell, J., thinks the evidence must be of "some-

thing more than mere quarrelsomeness."
'Tiffanyv. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 165; Commonwealth v. Straesser, 153 Pa. 451.

Commonwealth v. Weathers, 7 Kulp 1 ; Commonwealth v. Richmond, 6 W. N. C. 431; Common-

wealth v. Kern, 1 Brewst. 350.
"Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. 1.
,"Commonwealth v. Straesser, 153 Pa. 451; CommonWealth v. Weathers, 7 Kulp 1; Tiffany v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 165; Commonwealth v. Lenox, 3 Brewst. 249.
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whom he had some difficulty, and threatened to shoot him, no circumstances
being given to show how far the conduct was excusable. 1
THE CHARACTER OF OTHER THAN THE DECEASED.

If two or more persons make a concerted attack on a man, his fear will
be aroused by his knowledge of the malignity and ferocity of any one of
them. If, in defending himself, he kills one of them, he may show that
one or more of those whom he did not kill were dangerous men. In a case
in which the prisoner having been assaulted by one man, A, encouraged
and supported ba another, B, had shot A, he offered to prove that B "had
a notoriously bad reputation as to being a quarrelsome, bad-tempered, dangerous man, and that all this was known" to him. "For obvious reasons,"
says Sterrett, J., "that evidence should have been received. According
to defendant's own evidence, as we have seen, he was assaulted by both
Hocum (the deceased) and Crande, and he had as much right to prove
the bad reputation of the latter, as a violent and dangerous man, as he
would have had to prove the reputation of Hocum. It had a direct bearing on the question of justifiable self-defense." 2 If, in attempting to defend
himself by a revolver from an attack of B, the prisoner accidentally shot a
boy, who was not participating in the brawl, the bad character of B could
probably be shown in conjunction with evidence that the prisoner shot for
the purpose of disabling B.'

How THE CHARACTER IS TO BE PROVED.
It seems remarkable that when the accused wishes to excuse his use
of a deadly weapon by showing that he used it in order to defend himself
from grave injury threatened by the deceased, he is not permitted to show
former acts of the deceased known to him, which indicate his malignity,
ferocity, recklessness and murderousness. What better ground of fear of
a man could there be than knowledge, at first hand, of such acts? It
seems, however, that the defendant cannot show such acts, and his knowledge of them. In Commonwealth v. Bastian,' after evidence of a violent
assault by the deceased on the prisoner had been given, he offered to prove
"that the deceased had committed a murder years before, and had acted
out a career of lawlessness down to the hour of his death."
The trial
judges excluded the evidence of this homicide, or of any specific acts of
violence, save those occurring at the time of the killing, which was the subject of the indictment. In another case, a witness was called to prove that,
on one occasion, the deceased had, without provocation, violently assaulted
and beaten him. The evidence was rejected, because "evidence of a specific act is not admissible,"' since fairness would require an inquiry into the
'Commonwealth v. Straesser, 153 Pa. 451.
'Tiffany v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 165.
'Commonwealth v. Flanigan, 8 Phila. 430.
,Cited in Commonwealth v. Flanigan, 8 Phila. 430.
'Commonwealth v. Richmond, 6 W. N. C. 431.
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.circumstances of the act, and this inquiry would be impracticable.
In
Alexander v. Commonwealth, 1 after evidence of the reputation of the deceased for brutality, vindictiveness and violence had been given, the prisoner offered to prove that he had committed five specific crimes, involving
a ferocious and cruel disposition, and that the defendant had knowledge of
these crimes at the time of the killing. "It is settled," said Trunkey, J.,
"that specific criminal acts at other times, affecting other persons than the
slayer [the defendant], which may have given the deceased his bad character, are incompetent. Were evidence of such acts competent, so would
be repelling evidence, and the side issues would become as numerous as
the offences charged against the deceased."
The defendant may be able
to produce witnesses who, from personal observation, have known the deceased to be a dangerous man, and to prove that he had information from
them concerning the character of the deceased. He may himself have had
personal knowledge of the character. But this avails him not. He must
prove the reputation. He may have no knowledge of the reputation. He
may know only that persons knowing the dead man's acts have averred
that he had done this or that atrdcious deed. In -uch a case, he can make
no use of the decedent's character, though it influenced him more powerfully than knowledge of his reputation could have done. Hence, the effort
of the defendant in such cases should be to prove the reputation of the
deceased,' though occasionally the offer seems to have been, not to prove
a reputation of the deceased as being of a desperate character, but to prove
that he was of a desperate character.3
It is difficult to defend the exclusion of the prisoner's own knowledge
of atrocious acts of the deceased, and to deprive him of the advantage of
the jury's knowledge of them, simply because they have not given birth to
a reputation, 6r because he is not in a situation to prove this reputation.,
Knowledge of specific, concrete facts would more powerfully affect the fear
of the prisoner than knowledge of a reputation of an abstract ferociousness
or dangerousness.
The rule adopted seems to deny him the benefit of this
difference.
It might not be inadvisable, infavorem vitae, to relax the rule
in such cases.
WILLIAM TRICKETT.
'105 Pa. 1. In Commonwealth v. Seibert, Whart. on Homicide, the court admittted evidence of the
general character of the deceased as a quarrelsome, fighting, vindictive and brutal man, of great
physical strength, but rejected particular instances of his brutality in fighting.
2Tiffauy v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 165 ; Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. 1; commonwealth
v. Bastian, cited, 8 Phila. 435; Commonwealth v. Flanigan, 8 Phila. 430; Commonwealth v. Kern, 1
Brewst. 350; Commonwealth v. Lenox, 3 Brewst. 249.
'Abernethy v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 322 ; Commonwealth v. Weathers, 7 Kulp 1. In Commonwealth v. Straesser, 153 Pa. 451, the offer to prove the deceased to have been a man of quarrelsome nature, vicious disposition, and feared as a person of dangerous character, and that he had on several
occasions threatened to shoot and kill people, was iejected, says Paxson, J., because not coupled with
proof of defendant's knowledge of these facts, or of his having acted in self-defense.
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COMMONWEALTH vs. TOLSTON.
Bigamy-Mistake of fact not a defenseAct of March 27, 1903, construed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The defendant is indicted on a charge of
bigamy, the facts being as follows: The
defendant had employed an attorney to
procure for him a divorce from the woman
to whom he was then married. Subsequently the defendant was told by the
attorney that the divorce, an absolute annulment of the marriage, had been granted, and upon a fee paid gave defendant a
certificate setting forth the decree of divorce. The defendant, entirely innocent
of the fact that the certificate was a complete fraud, at once re-married, and soop
after was arrested and indicted upon the
above charge. The defendant was wholly
innocent of any wrong doing and re-married, relying on the fraudulent misrepresentations of the attorney.
WILLIS for Commonwealth.

Cited Act of March 31, 1860, P. & L. Dig.
1121.
It is no defense to a criminal accusation
that the defendant did not intend to violate or evade the law. State v. Vought, 90
N. C. 741;Com. v. Connelly, 163 Mass. 539.
A man may be guilty of bigamy although
he believes his former M~arriage is annulled,
when the statute describes the offense as
marrying again while a former husband
or wife is living, without any specific provision asto criminal intent. Statev. Zichfield, 34 L. R. A. 784.
The case is analogous to the selling of
intoxicants to minors and to the offense of
statutory rape. Farmer v. People, 77 Ill.
322; Vol. 4, P. & L. Dig. of Dec. 5656.

PAUL WILLIS, Busine..
J. HOWARD JACOS
W. C. SMITH
CHAS. HASSERT
FRANK P. BARNHART
ADDISON A. BOWMAN

fanager

for defendant.
In all cases where a remedy is provided
or duty enjoined, or anything directed to
be done, by any Act or Acts of Assembly,
PRICKETT

*

*

*

the direction of said acts shall be

strictly pursued, and no penalty shall be
imposed, or anything done, agreeably to
the provisions of the common law in such
cases, further than shall be necessary for
carrying such act or act,5 into effect. Act
March 21, 1806.
Guilty knowledge or guilty intent is an
essential element in crimes at common
law, but whether a criminal intent, or a
guilty knowledge, is a necessary ingredient
of a statutory offense is a matter of construction, to be determined from the language of the statute, in view of its manifest purpose and design. Com. v. Weiss,
139 Pa. 247. Cited also Act of March 31,
1860.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The statute under which the defendant
stands indicted, reads as follows:
"That from and after the passage of this
act, if any persons shall have two wives or
husbands, at one and the same time; or,
if any person who has entered into a contract of marriage with another person,
whether the marriage be valid in law or
not, shall, while the other contracting
party be alive, and before said former marriage has been legally declared void or
annulled by the decree of a proper court of
record, go through any form of marriage
recognized as binding under the laws of
this Commonwealth with any other person, whether the parties thereto cohabit
thereafter as man and wife, or not, he or
she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
Act of Mar. 27, 1903, P. L. 102.
This act does not change the law materially as it stood under the Act of March
31,1860. The provision concerning divorce
has been added, but the Act of March 13,
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1815, P. & L. Dig. Vol. 1, 1642, relating to
divorce provides "that the said parties
shall be at liberty to marry again in the
like manner as if they never had been
married," after a decree of absolute divorce.
In the present case, it is undisputed that
the defendant, having a living wife, married another, thus in the sense of the
words of the statute, if its letter is to be
followed and applied, is guilty of the crime
there defined. But it is alleged that the
second marriage was entered into under
circumstances amounting to a mistake of
fact, and since the evidence establishes the
fact that the defendant was "wholly innocent of any wrong doing," he cannot be
convicted of negligence in ascertaining a
proper knowledge of facts; for he would
under no circumstances be wholly innocent, where he was negligent concerning
the facts depended upon to establish mistake.
It appears that the defendant knew the
law which declares that one who is divorced is free to again marry; he instituted proper proceedings by an agent appointed as an officer of the court to bring
such suits: he received from this attorney
a certificate setting out what, had it been
what it appeared to be, would have been
legal evidence to protect the defendant in
the prosecution; he was not mistaken as to
his legal rights under the paper had it
been genuine. His mistake was, thatwhat
seemed to be a correct legal dissolution,
and would have been so if genuine, was
not in fact so, and acting under this mistaken state of mind, such state being due
to no carelessness and neglect of his, being
the result of no ignorance of law, and being such a state as had it been real would
have justified his act under the law, he
acted, and his defense is identical in kind
with that of the person who in the darkness of the night, convinced that one in
his room is a burglar, kills or injures an
inmate of the house. B1. Com., Book IV,
page 27, V.
Mr. Bishop states the rule concerning
mistake of fact in common law crimes
thus:
"The wrongful intent being the essence
of every crime, the doctrine necessarily
follows that whenever a man is misled
without his own fault or carelessness, con-
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cerning facts; and, so misled, acts as he
would be justified in doing were the facts
what he believes them to be, he is legally
innocent the same as he is morally."
Criminal Law, 3d Ed. Vol. 1, 384.
The defendant is clearly within the
above rule, and his conviction is an injustice to be avoided, or to be charged against
either the court or the legislature.
Bigamy was, at common law, a felony.
Kent, Vol. 2, page 79, note 7. "From the
earliest history of England polygamy has
been treated as an offense against society."
Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 165. By the
early statutes of some states it was punishable with death. Stat. of 1790 and 1800, of
N. C.
But the indictment is under a statute
which must be regarded as a modification
of the common law, and the question before the court is, whether the statute is to
be applied and literally construed in this
case; whether an honest mistake of fact
can be a defense to a charge of bigamy in
this state.
There have been various rules adopted
in different courts for the construction of
criminal statutes. The two extremes are
represented well by the rulings in North
Carolina, and in Michigan courts. The rule in North Carolina is stated as
follows: "Whenever an act is denounced.
-is unlawful by statute, the doing of that
act constitutes the offense, and the intent
with which the act is done is immaterial."
State v. Southern R., 41 L. R. A. 249.
The Michigan rule may be inferred from
the following words of the Supreme Courb
of that state, reversing a conviction in the
lower court of one who sold liquor to a minor, believing him to beof age: "Itcannot
be assumed that the legislature would attempt such awrongas to punish as criminal
an act which involved no criminal intent.
There can be no crime where there is no
criminal mind. This principle is as old as
the criminal law, and underlies the whole
of it." Faulks v. People, 39 Mich. 203.
The question of whether, under the circumstances of this' case, the defendant
should be acquitted, has not been decided
in Pennsylvania, in any reported case
called to the attention of the court by
counsel, or discovered by investigation,
and we must, therefore, construe the law
as it applies to the circumstances of this
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case unaided by any cases of our own di- again unless such belief is confirmed by
rectly in point. When we turn to the de- 'an absence of seven years." These two
cisions.of other jurisdictions, they are passages read together, show that the defendant was not convicted on grounds that
found to differ, as the courts of each jurisa mistake of fact was no excuse, but bediction have adopted either of the above
rules of construction, or assumed a position
cause the defendant had purposely broken
the law which defined the conditions unanywhere between the two extremes.
Mr. Endlich, in his work on Interpre- der which a mistake of fact should be adhations of Statutes, sect. 131, page 181, lays mitted iii evidence.
However, Chief Justice Lindsay, in
down this rule: "As a mens rea or guilty
mind is, with few exceptions, an essential Davis v. Commonwealth, 76 Ky. 318, takes
element in constituting a breach of crim- another view of the decision and cites it as
inal law, a statute however comprehen- supporting a decision that one who believed she was legally divorced in Utah
sive and unqualified it be in language, is
and married again, could not introduce the
usually understood as silently requiring
incomplete record of the Utah courts -to
that this element should be imported into it
negative criminal intent. But even under
unless a contrary intention be expressed."
the common law rule, if a Utah divorce
Again in sect. 129, p. 178, the same author
was not recognized in Kentucky, one atsays, "A statute which made in unqualitempting to introduce it as evidence to
fied language an act criminal or penal
negative intent would be mistaken, not as
would be understood as not applying where
to the facts but as to their legal effect,
the act was excusable or justifiable on
which is a mistake in law. And this is
grounds generally recognized by law."
This is the view of the English court in
also true of People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78,
Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. Div. 181, when. a case wlre a foreign divorce was not aldeciding upon the construction of a stat- lowed as a defense to a charge of bigamy,
or to negative intent. Mistake as to the
ute similar to that under consideration and
legal effect of agreements of separation
defining the same offense. Says Justice
Care in that case, "Honest and reasonable
would be excluded also, though the decisions are put in somecaseson othergrounds,
mistake stands, in fact, on the same footing as absence of the reasoning faculty, as
as in State v. Zitchfield, 34 L. R. A. 784,
presumably following Commonwealth v.
infancy or perversion of that faculty as in
Mash, supra,and State v. Hughes, 58 Iowa
lunacy. * * So far as Iam aware, it has
169; see also Mearano v. State, 22 (Tex.)
never been suggested that these exceptions
do not equally apply in case of statutory S. W. Rep. 684. The same reasoning will
offences unless they are excluded express- also be found in State v. Foster, .50 L. R.
ly or by necessary implication." The court
A. (R. I.)339.
here reached a conclusion directly opposed
Two cases which are parallel with the
one now under consideration, in that the
to that reached by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Mash,
defense interposed was in each case a mis7 Met. 472, a case in which the facts were take of fact and not of law, have been dealmost identical. In the latter case, decided; one, State v. Cain, 31 South Rep.
300, and one by the Supreme Court of Incided in 1884, Justice Shaw held that
"One, therefore, who marries within that
diana, Squire v. the State, 46 Ind. 459,
also reported in Green's Criminal Law
time (seven years), if the other party be
actually living, whether the fact be be- Reports, Vol. 1, page 725.
lieved or not, is chargeable with that &YimThe indictment in State v. Cain was uninal intent by purposely doing what thelaw
der a statute similar to that of Pennsylvaexpressly prohibits."
nia, and Justice Monroe, after quoting
The term "that
from Com. v. Mash, supra, gave as a
criminal intent" is explained by a prior
passage, where the court says: "The leg- proper charge to the jury, where the deislature intended to prescribe, and declare
fendant married in Georgia, was sued for
divorce and afterward moved to New Oras law, that no one should have a right
leans and married, that "if the jury found
upon such ignorance that the other party
that the defendant, being already married
is alive, or even upon such honest belief
to one woman, had married another, he
-of his-death, to take the risk of marrying
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was chargeable with the intent to commit
the crime of bigamy; and if he claimed to
have contracted the second marriage in
the honest belief that the first had been
dissolved by a decree of divorce, the onus
was upon him to establish to their satisfaction (his mental capacity and surroundings considered) that he had reasonable
grounds for such belief, and did in fact so
believe."
In the case of Squire v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana adopted the reasoning of Mr. Bishop, and quoted the following rule as governing: "But there may be
capacity for the criminal intent, while yet
no crime is committed, even though the
outward fact of what otherwise were crime
transpires. It is so where one, having a
mind free from all moral culpability, is
misled concerning facts. If, in such a
case, he honestly believes certain facts to
exist, and, though they do not, acts as he
would be legally justified in acting if what
he erroneously believes to be were real, he
is justified in law the same as in morals.
And the reader perceives that, in reason,
it must govern statutory crimes the same
as crimes at the common law. Suppose,
for example, a husband, intending to entrap his wife, goes out ostensibly on a sail
with confederates, and they come back
and represent that he is drowned, while
he secretly escapes abroad ; she believes
the statement, administers his effects, and
at the end of a year marries. Then he returns and procures her indictment for
bigamy. On a just consideration the common law rule and not the statutory one
prevails, and she should be acquitted."
Bishop on Statutory Crimes, sec. 355, p.
234. The court declared Mr. Bishop's
illustration covered the case of a man who,
without negligence, having been informed
that his wife had secured a divorce, married a second time, and directed a charge
accordingly. The differing conclusions of
the various courts passing upon practically the same statutes, applied under parallel circumstances, are for conviction or
acquittal, as the court adopts or rejects the
rule, that intent, oraguilty mind, is never
necessary to a statutory crime when the
words do not require it. Concerning the
weight of authority when brought to bear
on the facts under consideration, the editor of the Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law

says: "From the reasoning of the cases as
to belief in the death of the absent party,
it would seem that such a belief in divorce,
when honestly entertained, would be a
defense." Vol. 4, p. 40, b.
Neither the "common law rule" nor
"the statutory rule," as Mr. Bishop calls
them, seems to be the proper one for universal application. May, Crim. Law, sections 54 and 55. A more satisfactory rule,
founded upon the distinction between acts
mala in se and those merely mala prohibita, is stated thus in U. S. v. Leathers,
6 Sawyer 17 : "Where the statute does not
require the acts declared by it punishable
to have been done, in order to be so, knowingly, and they are not malum in se, nor
infamous, but only wrong because prohibited, a criminal intent need not be proved,
the offender being bound to know the law,
and obey it at his peril."
Practically the same rule is stated in
other words by Prof. Greenleaf, in see. 21,
Vol. III, of his work on Evidence: 11The
rule (i. e., that ignorance of fact will excuse) would seem to hold good in all cases
where the act, if done knowingly, would
be malurn in se. But wherea statute commands that an act be done, or omitted,
which, in the absence of such statute,
might have been done without culpability,
ignorance of the fact orstate of things contemplated by the statute, it seems will not
excuse its violation. *
"
* Such'is
also the case in regard to many other fiscal,
police and other laws and regulations, for
the mere violations of which, irrespective
of the motives or knowledge of the party,
certain penalties are enacted; for the law
in these cases seems to bind the parties to
know the facts, and to obey the law at
their peril." Evidently the latter clause
of this rule cannot be held to cover all cases
where the language of a statute is unqualified, else the first two clauses are meaningless.
The lower court In.Be Carlson's License,
127 Pa. 335, quoted this rule of Mr. Greenleaf, as did also the Supreme Court in
Coin. v. Weiss, 139 Pa. 247. Both these
cases held in strong language that, at least,
in case of police regulations, as concerning
the sale of oleomargarine, and the regulation of liquor selling, intent is immaterial,
and mistake of fact no defense. The case
of Pittsburg v. Katchthaler, 114 Pa. 552, is
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to the same effect, and if the language is
to be regarded as general, would rule this
case; while in the prior case of Kramer v.
Goodander, 98 Pa. 363, the intention of the
Legislature was found to prevent the application of a penal statute, though simply
a police regulation. Justice Clark, in Com.
v. Weiss, supra,says: "It is for the Legislature to determine whether the public
injury, threatened in any particular matter, is such and so great as to justify an
absolute and indiscriminate prohibition,"
but the facts in that case involved an unintentional breach of a regulation of the
sale of oleomargarine, the learned court
quoted Mr. Greenleaf's rule in full, and
cited only cases of violations of statutes
governing offences merely malaprohibita,
aud not malum in se. The decision is in
harmony with the rule adopted, but to
genleralize the language and apply it to
acts malum in se, would be to render it inconsistent with the eminent authority
upon which it is clearly intended to be
supported. At least, from no ease thathas come to our notice is the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania committed by any
adjudication to the application of the rule
that a malum in se is not necessary to the
commission of any statutory offence where
the language is unqualified. Until such
a decision, applying the strict rule of Com.
v. Weiss to acts mahm in se, we hold that
inasmuch as the defendant acted clearly
under a mistake of fact, and is admitted
to be "wholly innocent" morally, and
since otherwise he would stand convicted
of a heinous offence (a felony at common
law), that a verdict should be directed for
the defendant. A verdict is directed accordingly.
W. L. Houc, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The 34th section of the Act of March 31,
1860, 1 P. & L. 1121, enacts that "if any
person shall have two wives or two husbands at one and the same time, he or she
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor * * *
Provided, that if any husband or wife,
upon any false rumor, in appearance well
founded, of the death of the other, when
such other has been absent for two whole
years, hath married or shall marry again,
he or she shall not be liable to the penalties of fine and imprisonment imposed by
this act."
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A second marriage by one who already
has a spouse, is bigamous. But it is possible for one already a spouse to marry
again, believing that he is not already a
spouse. He may, e. g., believe that, that
which was in law a marriage was not, or
that the married relation has ended by a
divorce, or by the death of the other party.
The hardship ot punishing a person for a
marriage into which he entered because he
believed that he was single was brought
to the notice of the Legislature. It has
provided for one of the cases, but not for
others. For a mistake as to death of the
earlier spouse, it has furnished an exemption. It has furnished none for a mistake
as to the divorce of an earlier spouse., We
must suppose that when the Legislature
made provision for one case of innocent
ignorance only, it intended that in no other
ease should this ignorance excuse.
Nor has the Legislature. exempted from
guilt in all cases in which there is an
honest belief of the death of the former
spouse. It is only when the belief is in
consequence of an apparently well founded
rumor of death, and the spouse has
been absent for two years, that the immunity exists. The rumor may be ever so
well founded, but it cannot safely be believed, unless there has been an absence
for two whole years. The Legislature apparently intends that a second marriage of
ofie already a spouse shall incur punishment, however convinced the party may
be of the death of the spouse, unless the
absence of two years has occurred.
The very careful and able opinion of the
learned court below has shown a conflict
in the decisions, some of which, of very
able courts, have invented exemptions additional to those of the statutes. There is
a repellent harshness in punishing a person who believes that his act is unforbidden. The definition of the offence may
make willfulness and knowledge one of its
ingredients. But it cannot be contended
that where this is not explicitly done by
the Legislature, it is for the courts to inject it by adjudication.
What harsher thing than to punish for
the violation of a law of which the accused
was ignorant? a law, e. g., that was signed
by the Governor an hour before he broke
it?
Suppose the law known, but its meaning
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uncertain. Jurists may differ as to its
sense. Nevertheless, each subject of it
takes the risk if he violates it, with or
without knowledge that it bears the sense
in which his act is an infraction of it.
Mistake of fact cannot be pleaded in all
cases surely in exoneration of an accused.
If the statute prohibits the sale of liquor
to a minor, an honest mistake as to minority will not shield one who sells in fact,
though unwittingly, to a minor. He may
have exercised great care. The minor
may look like a man of thirty years. His
friends may declare him to be thirty years
of age. But the vendor sells to him at his
peril.
Tolston avers that he believed that he
had been divorced. His attorney delivered him what the former called a certificate of the clerk of the court, that a decree
of divorce had been granted. We think it
would be a serious weakening of the influence of the penalty for bigamy to allow
proof of a belief that a divorce had been
had, and in this way. How many libellants, having no real ground for a divorce,
might be furnished with similar certificates? At every bar, it is to be feared, are
lawyers who would little hesitate to fabricate and sell certificates to unsuspecting
clients if it became known that such a
certificate would procure immunity to the
purchaser of it. The libellant might prudently refrain from too great inquisitiveness into the transactions of the court, or
from too great punctiliousness with regard
to the reputation of the lawyer whom he
selected. He might easily raise in the
jurors' minds a reasonable doubt as to his
belief in the completion of the divorce proceedings.
It is better, we think, to take the risk of
occasionally punishing a man who innocently believed himself, because of a divorce, to be free to marry, when he had in
fact not been divorced, than to take the
risk of diminishing the diligence of libellants in inquiries with respect to the acts
of the court on their cases, and of increasing the temptation of lawyers to forge certificates.
Many authorities on the general subject
may be found in 4 Am. & Eng. Encyc.,
40, 41 ; vide Com. v. Mash, 7 Mete. 472 ;
Com. v. Hayden, 163 Mass. 453 ; Clark,
(Crim. Law, 88. "Where there has been

no valid divorce from the first marriage,
an honest belief to the contrary, even with
advice of counsel, is no defense." Clark,
Crim. Law, 355.
Arrest of judgment reversed, and court
below directed to enter judgment on the
verdict.

CONROY vs. McKINNEY.
Bankruptcy-Debtsdischargeableand not
affected by discharge-Fiduciarycapacity defined.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The plaintiff had shipped goods to the
defendant to be sold on commission.
This was done on numerous occasions
until the defendant became bankrupt and
finally received a discharge in bankruptcy. There was a sum of $2,000 due
plaintiff at the time of bankruptcy upon
which he received, filing his claim, dividends amounting in all to $1,000. This
action is assumpsit for the balance, and
the defendant 'Pleads his discharge in
bankruptcy.
AMERMIAN attorney for plaintiff.
A commission merchant, occupies a
fiduciary capacity.
Drovers' and Merchants' National Bank v. Roller et at, 36
L. R. A. 767; Londenberger v. Londenberger, 16 Phila 11; McCullough v.
Porter, 4 W. & S 177.
Debts created by fraud, embezzlement,
misappropriation or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary
capacity, are not affected by discharge in
bankrupty. See. 17, Act 1898.
Rule laid down in Chapman v. Forsyth,
2 Howard 202, was on the Act of 1841.
The acts of 1867 and 1898 are broader, and
see. 17, Act 1898, applies to all cases of
fiduciary capacity, and not alone to
technical trustees.
HILLYER attorney for defendant.
A factor, does not occupy a fiduciary
capacity within the meaning of see. 17 of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Scott v.
Porter Bros., 93 Pa. 38; Chapman v.
Forsyth, 2 Howard 202; Hayman v. Pond,
7 Metcalf 328.
Although the above decisions were on
former statutes, phrases in a statute
which have received a judicial construction before its enactment are to be understood according to that construction unless the statute clearly requires a different
one. McKee v. McKee, 17 Md. 352; Com.
v. Hartnett, 3 Gray 450.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff seeks to recover from the
defendant, a factor, the sum of one
thousand dollars, the balance due to the
former from the proceeds of the sales of
goods consigned to the defendant for disposal. The defendant denies his liability
by pleading his discharge in bankruptcy
which he alleges relieved him of the debt
in question. Hence the matter involved
depends upon whether a debt of this
nature is one of those enumerated in the
Bankruptcy Act by which the discharge
of the debtor frees him from any further
liability for the debt.
The general rule is that the discharge of
a debtor granted in bankruptcy operates
to relieve the debtor entirely of liability
for all debts which were provable against
him, even though proof was not actually
made; but as with all rules there are well
defined exceptions to this, and among
them sec. 17, of the Act of 1898, provides
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall relieve
the bankrupt from all of his provable
debts except such as were created by his
fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or
defalcation while acting as an officer or in
any fiduciary capacity." That the defendant is not an officer is evident.
Hence, if the debt is one that is not discharged it must be embraced in the
phrase "as in any fiduciary capacity."
While in the general acceptation of the
term, the debt is one of a fiduciary nature.
Jayne v. Mickey, 55 Pa. 260; McCollough
v. Porter, 4 W. & S. 177. Yet whether it
was the intention of Congress to place it
among the exceptions is another question
and one not so easily answered. That we
may arrive at a correct solution of the
subject, it may not be amiss to look at the
previous acts in this branch of the law.
The first of these is the Act of 1841,
wherein it is provided that: "Debts which
shall not have been created in consequence of a defalcation as a public officer,
or as an executor, administrator, guardian
or trustee, or while acting in any other
fiduciary capacity, shall on a compliance
with the requisites of the bankruptcy law,
be entitled to a discharge under it." Now
a debt due by an individual not created
as above stated is within the provisions of
the act although he may be under
fiduciary obligations. This is the natural
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import. of the provision and it is sustained
by reason. In Chapman v. Forsyth, 2
Hlow. 202, wherein the question was involved as to whether a debt due by a
factor to his principal is a fiduciary obligation, it was decided: "If the act embraced such a debt it will be difficult to
limit its application, as it must include
all debts arising from agencies

*

*

The

cases enumerated executor, administrator,
guardian or trustee are not cases of implied but special trusts and the other
"fiduciary capacity" mentioned must
mean the same class of trusts. A factor is
not, therefore, within the act."
The provision of the Act of 1867 is that:
"No debt created by fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in
any fiduciary capacity, shall be discharged
under this act."
If the word fiduciary in this act be
not construed as it was in the former it
will be as difficult to limit its application
as it would have been under the Act of
1841, had it not then been confined to
technical trusts. The word is used in the
same sense in the Act of 1867 as in the
prior statute. Scott v. Porter Bros., 93
Pa. 301; Cronin v. Cutting, 104 Mass. 245.
With these decisions before us it is difficult to see how we can place any different
construction on the phrase "in any fiduciary capacity" in the Act of 1898, when
Congress has not made it manifest in any
way that they intended to enlarge the
judicial interpretation placed on the Acts
of 1841 and 1867. Especially is this so
when: "Words and phrases, the meaning
of which in astatute has been ascertained,
are when used in a subsequent statute to
be understood in the same sense." Cronin
v. Cuttiog, supra; McKee v. McKee, 17
Md. 352. It appears to us that Congress
by omitting the enumeration of the
specific trusts did not intend to enlarge
the term "fiduciary capacity;" but the
specific enumeration was omitted because
all were included in the term fiduciary,
and this bad, by judicial interpretation,
received a fixed definition. Looking at it
from a ratfonal standpoint, we think this
can be the only true construction. Any
other interpretation would leave but few
debts upon which the law could operate.
The relation existing between plaintiff
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and defendant is that ofdebtorand creditor.
State v. Oriental Mills, 18 R. I. 352.
True, the law implies an obligation from
the trust imposed on the debtor; but in almost all commercial transactions of the
country confidence is reposed in the integrity of the debtor and a violation of
this is, in a commercial sense, a disregard
of the trust. Scott v. Porter Bros., supra.
Judgment is accordingly entered for the
defendant.
FLYNN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Judgment is affirmed upon the able and
lucid opinion of the Court below. The relation between the parties was that of
debtor and creditor. The claim in quest
tion was not only a provable one in bankruptcy, but by the facts, had actually
been proved and a dividend obtained.
The remaining point to consider, whether
the claim was within the exceptions of
see. 17 and consequently not discharged,
is sufficiently treated by the learned Court
below. Re Basch, 97 F. R. 761, is a late
case in accord. See also 13 Harvard Law
Review, 603.
Judgment affirmed.

JAMES attorney for defendant.
The owner of property can follow his
property into whatever shape it assumes;
provided, however, it remains of the same
species. Snyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawle 423.
In altered species an article cannot be
replevied because identification is imipossible. Snyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawle 423.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is an elementary principle of the law
that no one, by any operation upon or
change of the materials of another, can
make them his own; except that the materials themselves be changed into a different species. Snyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawle
423.
This limitation as to species was made
at a very early date. In Justinian it is
stated "that if the species or manufactured article can be reduced to its former
rude materials, then the owner of such
materials is to be reckoned the owner of
the species; but if the species cannot be so
reduced, then he who made it is understood to be the owner of it; for example a
vessel can easily be reduced to the rude
mass of brass, silver or gold of which it is
made, but wine, oil or flour cannot be converted into grapes, olives or corn, neither
can mulse be separated into wine and
HILL vs. WILKUM.
honey. But if a man makes any species
Replevin-Substantial identity of article partly with his own and partly with the
replevied-Change of species affecting materials of another, as if he should make
mulse with his own wine and another's
replevin.
honey, or should make a garment with an
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
admixture of his own wool with that of
The plaintiff sold the defendant a quananother, it. is not to be doubted in such
tity of fifty bushels of corn, which the
cases but that he who made the species is
latter was to take from a certain crib.
master of it." Lib. 2, tit. 1,p.75.
The defendant procured the fifty bushels
This rule has quite generally been foland took in addition twenty-five more lowed, but we fail to see the necessity for
bushels from another of plaintiff's cribs
the limitation, or the justice of it.
without his knowledge. The defendant
The necessary elements of an action of
converted the entire amount of corn into
replevin are: first, personalty that may be
whiskey and the plaintiff seeks to replevy
the object of the proceeding; and second,
the whiskey, contending that by reason of a party having title to maintain the
the defendant's tortious action he is enaction.
titled to same.
The owner who has been wrongfully deHUBLER attorney for plaintiff.
prived of his property, is allowed to reA mere conversion of personal property
plevy it because he still holds the title;
does not invest the title to the property in
he is allowed to replevy it although
the tort feasor, and the owner may rework has been- done upon it by one
plevy the goods. Snyder v. Vaux, 2
Rawle 423.
having no title, because a trespasser
Nor, does it matter that the converted
cannot complain if the owner elects to
article is changed in species if the original material may, by testimony, be take his property if he can find it. Gates
traced through the process of transforma- v. Rifle Broom Co., 70 Mich. 309.
tion. Salisbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379.
If, here, the plaintiff had sought to re-
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plevy the twenty-five bushels of corn if it
were still in existence, there could have
been no doubt of his right. The line,
however, seems to be drawn at "the
identity of the original materials." The
reason for drawing the line at that point
is the necessity of the proof of title before
replevin shall lie. The test of "identity
of original materials" can only serve to
work injustice to the true owner.
If it be the object of the law to protect
the owner how can it matter whether
there is a change into a different species
or not, if positive proof can be given that
the transformed article is the product of
the original property of the plaintiff?
Salisbury & Calkins v. McCoon & Sherman, 3 N. Y. 379. A failure to prove the
identity of the original materials may injure the party seeking to recover; but to
prove the property by extraneous evidence cannot injure the defendant; he has
no right to complain.
Gates v. Rifle
Broom Co., mspra.
Therefore, if it be found that the whiskey from which this quantity is sought to
be replevied, contains the product from
the twenty-five bushels of corn, judgment
for plaintiff for his aliquot portion. If
the whiskey is not the product of the
corn in question then judgment for
defendant.
AMERMAN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREIE COURT.
Whether the plaintiff sought to recover
all the whiskey made from the 75 bushels
of corn does not distinctly appear. If he
sought to recover only one-third of it, the
action of replevin would- be proper. Wilkinson v. Stewart, 85 Pa. 255; Henderson
v. Lauck, 21 Pa. 359.
Wilkum was not, and Hill was, theowner
of the 25 bushels. The former took them
without the knowledge of the latter. We
think the inference permissible that Wilkum took them knowing that he was doing so without right. The doctrine, supported by a considerable number ofauthorities, is, that if B, without wrongful intent,
takes the goods of A, and, by labor and
expense, transforms them into articles
worth much more than they were originally worth, the property is changed, and
A has only an action for the value of the
article at the time of the conversion. This
principle was applied in a case where B
took A's timber, worth $25, and converted
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it into hoops, worth $700. Wetherbee v.
Green, 22 Mich. 311 (Cooley, J). It is implied in Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 378,
where A's corn had been turned by B into
whiskey, and in Lewis v. Courtright, 77
Ia. 190, where grass, worth eight or ten
cents per acre, was turned into hay, worth
from $2 to $3 per ton. Cf. 2 Kent, Comm.
363; 2 BI. Comm. 404 ; 1 Cent. Dig., Art.
Accession, 438 et seq.
When B takes A's property, and, with
knowledge that he has no right to do so,
changes its species, it nevertheless continues A's; e. g., wood turned into coal,
Curtis v. Groat, 6 Johns. 168; timber made
into shingles,.Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns. 348 ;
corn made into whiskey, Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 378; wood turned into posts
and rails, Snyder v. Vaux, 2 R. 423. The
court below properly held that Hill continues to be the owner of the whiskey that
was made from his 25 bushels of corn.
The corn from the two cribs, so far as
appears, was of the same sort. The whiskey made from each lot would be indistinguishable from the other. There are
cases that seem to hold that when the confusion has taken place with the knowledge
of the confuser that he was acting without
right; the entire mass is the property of
the one whose goods have been improperly
taken. Others limit the principle by the
qualification that the goods commingled,
in order to become the property of the innocent party must be of different qualities.
We think the plaintiff gets all he is entitled to when, as in the present case, the
mixed goods being indistinguishable in
quality, he receives as much of them as he
would have had had there been no confusion. If A, having blended 50 bushels
with B's 25, and made whiskey from the
75, would lose the whole amount of it to
B, for a similar reason A would lose all,
though his own was 10, or 20, or 100, or
1,000 times as great as that of B. Such a
result would be intolerable. Cf. 10 Cent.
Dig. 1075; Ryder v. Hathaway, 21 Pick.
298; 2 Kent Comm. 297; Wetherbee v.
Green, 22 Mich. 316.
The judgment of the learned court below
must, therefore, be affirmed.
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It is a fundamental principle of law,
and non disputable, that the intention of
lVills-costruction of- Where the lan- the testator is always an important factor
guage o.f a bequest if applied to land in the interpretation of a will, and "the
would give a fee, it would confer an ab- intent is to be so construed as to be consolute estate in the legacy-By Act of
sistent with the rules of law, but where it
1897 a devise over should first taker
is plain, it will be allowed to control the
"die childless" is not an indefinite fail- legal operation of the words, however,
ure of issue but a valid limitation over, technical."
McMasters v. Shellito, 14
yet in a case of doubt such an interpre- Sup. 303.
tation will be adopted as to give the
Too much stress cannot be laid on this
first taker an absolute estate.
fact as it is the most important element
entering into the construction of wills.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
"All mere technical rules of construction
Kemmer devised a house to the execumust give way to the plainly expressed
tor, tosell within one year after his death,
intention of the testator if that intention
and directed "the proceeds to be paid to' is lawful." Thran v. Herzog, 12Sup. 551.
my daughter, Sarah, but should she die
What, judging from the language of
childless then they shall go to my son,
the will, was the intention of the testator?
Jacob."
Sarah received the proceeds,
The words of the instrument are un$4,500, placed them in bank, and died
ambiguous and. capable of the compresuddenly within a week afterwards, havhension of even a child. Therefore there
ing never been married. Her half sister
can be not the least doubt in the world
(daughter of her mother by a former marthat it was the intention of the testator
riage) claims one-half of the fund. Jacob
that on the death of his daughter, the
claims all of it, as ulterior legatee of his
property which she had derived by his
father.
will, shoull pass to his son Jacob. Surely
SPENCER and HENNEKE for the plaintiff.
there can be nothing illegal about such a
The words "die childless" refer to the
provision.
death of the legatee during the life of the
Was it then a valid provision which
testator and in such event only will the
would receive the support of the law?
subsequent dispositions over, take effect.
We believe this can be answered in the
Biddle's Estate, 28 Pa. 59. Ingersol's
affirmative, and the rule as to-day recogAppeal, 86 Pa. 240.
As to personal property there is no disnized in Pennsylvania on this subject is
tiUnction as to brothers and sisters of the
contained in the case cited on the brief of
whole and half blood. Miller's Estate, 2
the learned counsel for the defendant, i. e.
Wood 174. P. & L. Dig. Col. 2412.
Eichelberger v. Barnitz, 17 S. & R. 293.
M. S. KAUFMAN and Fox for the deTherefore, in consideration of the argufendant.
ments submitted by the learned counsel,
Where there is a definite failure of issue
and the law as expressed in the above
the limitation over is good, 6 Pa. 45, and
named case, we enter judgment for the dewhere the failure is indefinite the Courts
will const;ue it into an estate tail, which
fendant, with costs.
IN

BE KEMMER'S ESTATE.

under the Act of 1855, gives a fee to the
first taker. Robinson's Estate, 149 Pa.
418. Such a devise over, after a fee, on
the death of the first taker leaving no
issue at time of -his death, is a good executory devise. Lovett v. Lovett, 10 Phila.
537; Umstead & Reiff's Appeal, 60 Pa.
365. Rapp v. Rapp, 6 Pa. 45; Cameron
v. Coy, 165 Pa. 290; Eichelberger v.
Barnitz, 17 S. & R. 293.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

After the most thorough investigation
extending over a number of months, the
Court has at last arrived at a definite conclusion as to the law concerned in the
case now before us for our consideration.

HASSERT, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Kemmer devised the house to the executor, for the purpose of selling it within a
year, and of paying the proceeds "to my
daughter Sarah," but, should she die
childless, then they shall go to my son
"Jacob."
The proceeds, therefore, were bequeathed
to Sarah. But what interest did she take,
a life estate, or an absolute one?
It is a principle that when the language
in which a bequest is made would, if ap•plicable to land, have given a fee simple,
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whether under the rule in Shelly's case,
or otherwise, it will confer an absolute
estate in the legacy.
Biddle's Appeal,
69 Pa. 190; Potts' Appeal, 30 Pa. 168;
Hoff's Estate, 147 Pa. 636; Smith's Appeal, 23 Pa. 9; Paff v. Smith, 3 Lack. Jur.
393.
Would the gift to Sarah, if its subject
had been land, have given a fee tail, or
since the Act of 1855, a fee simple? It is
not necessary that, in a will, "heirs" or
"issue" should be used. The gift is to
Sarah. Unqualified, this would have
given her the money. It is qualified by
the words "should she die childless."
"Die childless" may, we think, be treated
as the equivalent of "die without issue,"
and prior to the Act of July 9th, 1897,
P. L. 213, this phrase was held to import
an indefinite failure of issue. With such
a sense, the gift to Sarah would have been
absolute and the ulterior limitation would
have been void. Sarah's death would not
have entitled Jacob to receive the money.
The Act of 1897, however, requires that
the phrase shall be understood to mean a
failure of issue not at any time, but at the
death of Sarah, and with this sense the
limitation over would be valid.
There is another interpretation of the
clause, however, an interpretation which
makes it mean death, childless within the
year, or before the sale of the land, or
death childless, before the testator's own
death. The testator may, in limiting the
gift to Jacob, have intended to provide for
the death of Sarah before himself, or before the time for selling the land and paying over the fund. Mitchel v. Railway
Co., 165 Pa. 645; Jacksons' Estate, 179 Pa.
77; Coles v. Ayres, 156 Pa. 197; Engle's
Estate, 180 Pa. 215.
Such an interpretation, in a case of
doubt, will be adopted as will give an absolute estate to the first taker. We are of
opinion that, on the daughter, Sarah,
surviving her father, and the sale of the
farm, she acquired an absolute interest in
the legacy. Her subsequent death without issue had no effect upon that interest.
Decree reversed with procedendo.
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YOUNG vs. COMMONWEALTH.
Constitutionallaw- The Act of JuneS,1885,
entitled "An act for the suppression of
lottery gifts by storekeepers and others
to securepatronage,"declaredunconstitutional under Art. 3, See. 3, requiring
subject to be clearly expressed in the title
-The phrase, "lottery gifts." does not
embrace anything free from changeWherefore trading stamps, which may
contain specicationsof articleto be received in exchange, would be no lottery.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

By Act of Assembly, the so-called trading stamp business is declared illegal, and
those engaging in same, or merchants patronizing stamp companies, are guilty of
a misdemeanor, and subject to fine and
imprisonment. Appellant engaged in inhibited business, and was found guilty and
fined. Appeal.
FLYNN for the Commonwealth.

The Constitution of the United States
does not limit the State in the exercise of
its police power. Barker v. Com., 113 U.
S.27; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S.133;
Givens v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1.
The act is a valid exercise of the police
power of the State, and does not conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. The
rights to carry on a particular business or
calling, and right of contract, are not guaranteed by the amendment against the police power of the State. Slaughterhouse
Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Bartemeyer v. Iowa,
18 Wall. 129; Powell v. Pa., 127 U. S.678.
Nor is it in conflict with any provision
of the State Constitution. Citing Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. 147; Long v. State,
12 L. R. A. 425; Sinking Fund Cases. 99
U. S.700; Humes v. Ft. Smith, 93 Fed.
Rep. 857 ; Kentucky v. R. R. Cases, 115
U. S. 321.
FLEITZ for defendant.

The act is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. Powell v. Pa., 127 U. S.
678; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S.578.
The only way in which a State may
make such legislation is by exercise of its
police power, and then it must bear a
reasonable relation to promotion of health,
good order or morals. Richstraw v. People, 185 Ill. 133; Slaughterhouse Cases, 16
Wall. 36; Chicago v. Fletcher, 183 Ill. 104;
State v. Dalton, 22 R. I. 77.
Premiums given by tradesmen are not
lotteries, and cannot be prohibited. People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389.
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OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

This question is by no means a new one,
but has been decided in numerous cases in
many States.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
"That no State'slall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of its laws."
The portion of this section which requires our consideration is, "Nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty
or property."
Liberty has been construed, and means
more than freedom from restraint. It
means not only the right to go where one
chooses, but to do such acts as he may
judge best for hisinterest, not inconsistent
with the equal rights of others. That he
may follow such pursuits as he is best
fitted for, to use his faculties in any lawful
manner, and to earn his livelihood by
means of any lawful calling. And for that
purpose he may enter into any contract
which may be proper or necessary to carry
out such purpose. State v. Dalton, 22 R.
I. 77 ; Powell v. Penn., 127 U. S. 678;
People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 387.
Counsel for theCommonwealth contends
that the authority vested in the State by
this Act of Assembly comes within the
police power of the tate, because "it prohibits schemes which are in the nature of
a lottery or gift enterprise," and, for this
reason, should be within the police power
to regulate ; therefore, this act prohibiting
them is not unconstitutional. We cannot
see that the Fourteenth Amendment conflicts in any way with the police power of
the State. This act of selling goods and
giving.stamps does not interfere with the
police power. It is necessary that the act
should have some reference to the public
health, safety or morals to accomplish an
object falling within the police power.
State v. Dalton, 22 R. I. 77.
The Commonwealth also contends that
this is simply a new form of lottery, where
a person gets something for nothing. We
think the element of uncertainty which is
found in a lottery is entirely lacking in
this case. Forexample: This is notacase

where a man pays his money and runs his
chance of getting something, but he pays
his money and gets what he pays for;
and, as an extra inducement to continue
his patronage, he is given a premium
stamp, redeemable at a certain store upon
presentation. It seems to us to be a mere
matter of competition in business for one
merchant to give stamps in order to increase his trade. "Competition is the life
of business," and, we think, that when
carried out in a lawful manner as this is,
that any legislation to prevent it is in
derogation ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.
Most of the cases we have perused have
been where there was a discrimination as
to premiums given by the dealer and those
given by a third person, but we are not to
decide that point.
It is always to be presumed that Acts of
the General Assembly are passed upon the
utmost good faith, and are not to be declared void by the court, unless clearly unconstitutional. Young v. Commonwealth,
45 S. E. Reporter 327; Com. v. Moorehead, 7 C. C. 513.
In Com. v. Moorehead, supra, Judge
Endlich holds that the Act of June 3, 1885,
entitled "An Act for the suppression of
lottery gifts by storekeepers and others to
secure patronage," reciting in the preamble that the laws against gambling and
lotteries are evaded by the giving of tickets
entitling the holders to money or articles
of value as inducements to purchasers, and
providing that merchants and others giving and selling such tickets shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, is void,
under Art. 3, Par. 3, of the Constitution,
requiring the subject to be clearly expressed
in the title. The title is misleading; the
phrase, "lottery gifts," does not embrace
anything which is free from chance or
hazard.
But, upon authority, we think the passage of the Act of Assembly in this case is
not a valid exercise of the legislative
power, as it attempts to prohibit and restrain the plaintiff in error in the lawful
execution ot a lawful business.
We have followed closely in the steps of
the courts in the cases of Young v. Com.,
supra, and State v. Dalton, upra, believing that the opinions are in conformity
with good law and reasoning.
For these reasons the judgment of the
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lower court is reversed, andjudgment rendered for the plaintiff in error.
MONTE F.

MOOREHOUSE, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The Act of June 3, 1885, enacts that
"any merchant, etc., * * * who shall
offer, give or sell * * * any purchaser

•

•

*
*

any ticket or tickets, check or checks
*

entitling such purchaser

*

*

to demand or receive money or any article
of value, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," and be punishable with a fine
or imprisonment, or both.
The question presented is, is this act
valid? One objection to itis, that its title
gives no notice of its contents. It is entitled "An act for the suppression of lottery
gifts by storekeepers and others to secure
patronage." A very able judge, Endlich,
has said, the acts forbidden have no element of a lottery. The ticket or check,
whose sale is prohibited, entitles the buyer
"to demand or receive money or any'articleof value." The kind and quality of the
article of value might be specified on the
ticket. There would then be no reprehensible element of chance; there would be no
"lottery-gift." For this reason the act
violates the Constitution of the State.
Commonwealth v. Moorehead, 7 Pa. C. C.
513.
We are not prepared to say that the act
violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. It does
not deprive of life. Does it deprive of liberty and property? It does inhibit certain
acts, and, in a sense, deprives of liberty.
But so do all penal or criminal statutes.
They all forbid acts which men have the
natural power, and often the will, to do.
Some infringements, indeed, very many
infringements of liberty, are practically
held to be deprivations with due process of
law; that is, -if the phrase in this connection means anything, proper, permissible
deprivations. Unfortunately, there are no
objective tests of what is a proper, permissible deprivation, save the types of common and usual deprivations found in the
law before and at the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment; or of the Fifth
Amendment, in which the same phrase
appears in a restriction on Federal power.
These tests are not adequate. Besides
them, are only the subjective tests found
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in the emotions and judgmenjts of the
judges; emotions and judgments which
not only vary with the judges, butwith the
humors, circumstances, points of view, of
the same judge.
To make, to sell, or to buy and drink
liquor, or opium, may with propriety be
forbidden, the judges think. To wear the
badge of the Grand Army may be penalized. To work more than six days out of
seven; to utter profane words, may be
penalized. The having for sale oleomargarine, though no fraud is practiced, may
be criminalized without violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. No one doubts
that gambling or the stipulating to part
with property on the happening of a certain illegitimately specified contingency,
may be prohibited, although, generally,
one may do what he will with his own;
give it away, sell it at half-price. The
gambling is prohibited because of its bad
effects on the tendencies of those who indulge in it, and the extraordinary and
often destructive risks it betrays them into
assuming. Lotteries have been long prohibited, although at one time they were
indulged in, both in England and her
Anierican Colonies, for the promotion of
all imaginable schemes, charitable, religious, mercantile, industrial and social.
They are, like gambling, supposed to have
a sinister influence on those who partake
in them. They offer special opportunities
to some, to enrich themselves at the expense of the adventurous, speculative, foolish and avaricious. Because of these mischiefs attending the custom or usage of lottery-patronizing, each particularlottery is
tabooed.
The scheme of selling or giving tickets
to purchasers, by which they may procure
something additional to what they are
professedly buying, appeals to the name instincts, the same foibles, the same heedlessness, speculativeness, cupidity, to
which the lottery appeals, and it may, little by little, lead to the same mischievous
consequences. It may induce an increase
of the price of the article which is the ostensible object of the contract, for we may
be sure that neither the vendor nor the
merchant on whom his check or ticket is
an order, is, in the long run, parting with
something for nothing. It will often induce persons to buy a thing simply in or-
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der to get the collateral article, or to buy
more of the first then, than they otherwise
would, in order to get the article. In People v. Gilson, 109 N. Y. 389, the evidence
showed that the buyer of two pounds of
coffee bought more than one pound, in order to get an additional check, without
which he could not demand a cup and
saucer which, with two checks, he could
demand.
In view of the similarity of the reasons
for frowning on lotteries and gambling, to
those for deprecating the custom of offering trade tickets, we are not willing to say
that the former can, and the latter cannot
be constitutionally forbidden by the legislature. The excess of the value that may
be gained, over the value spent in buying
the opportunity to get it, betrays men
into making the purchase of the chance; and
it is certain that a large percentage of those
who thus buy will lose all and that only a
rareexception will win the prize. Thisisthe
more important and deprecable element
in the transaction. That the issue depends on chance, is significant, simply
because, if the issue depended on anything else, the buyer would be less ready
to buy, and the seller to sell the opliortunity.
Liquor selling can be forbidden, not because liquor, in certain quantities, is not
wholesome and useful, but because, in
other quantities, it is deleterious, and in
too great a percentage of cases, those who
consume at all consume too much. The
tendency of the system of free sale, may
be a justification for prohibiting any sale.
The having of oleomargarine for sale,
can be penalized, not because it is unwholesome, but because it can be made to
resemble butter, and buyers can be deceived and, in the long run, some percentage of them will be deceived into believing.it butter and buying it as such.
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678.
The habit of feeling and of action which
the trade-order is fitted and intended to
foster, is quite as detrimental to the buyer,
and the seller, and quite as demoralizing
to the people, as many things whose prohibition is freely conceded to be within
legislative competence.
For the first, but not for the second
reason urged against the validity, we are
constrained to hold the statute invalid.

We have not been convinced by the
able and authoritative judgments in State
v. Dalton, 22 R. L 77; Young v. Commonwealth, 45 S. East. Rep. 327, and People
v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 387.
Judgment affirmed.
GRACEY vs. TOPLIFF.
Assumpsit-Liabilityof the wife where she
joins -in a note with her husband-Presumption is that she is liable as makerBurden o.f proof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A note on which the parties promised
"jointly and severally" to pay $250 to
Gracey was signed by John and Rebecca
Topliff, husband and wife. John Topliff
had bought a house, giving a mortgage on
it for one-fourth of the purchase money.
The house he intended for his wife and he
made later a deed for it to her and at the
same time borrowed $250 with which to
pay the balance of the mortgage. He paid
that balance with the money. For the $250
the note was given. Mrs. Topliff suggested the borrowing and urged her husband to make it. She now denies her
liability in assumpsit against her alone.
RENo for the plaintiff.
In a joint and several note, each signer,
no matter how many there may be, assumes the entire responsibility of paying
the whole sum. It is optional with the
holder whether he will proceed against
any one or all of the signers. Act of May
15, 1901, sec. 68.
Where an evidence of indebtedness is
given by the husband and wife, jointly
and severally, and the obligation is given
fora loan to pay a pre-existing indebtedness
on the wife's estate, the said obligation
can be collected from the wife alone.
Building Ass. v. Ainweg, 22 Sup. 143.
ScHwARTzKOPF

for the defendant.

The wife's undertaking was one of
suretyship and was invalid. Underwood's
Estate, 5 Pa. Co. C't 621.
A married woman may not become accommodation indorser, maker, guarantor
or surety for another. Act of June 8,
1893. Real. Estate Ins. Co. v. Roop, 132
Pa. 496.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Assumpsit-A note on which the parties
promised "jointly and severally" to pay
$250 to Gracey was signed by John and
Rebecca Topliff, husband and wife. John
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Topliff had bought a house, giving
a mortgage on it for one-fourth of
the purchase money. The house he intended for his wife and he made later a
deed for it to her and at the same time
borrowed 5250 with which to pay the balance of the mortgage. He paid that balance with the money. For the $250 the
note was given. Mrs. Topliff suggested
the borrowing and urged her husband to
make it. She now denies her liability in
assumpsit against her alone.
The case before us is one in which the
wife is the sole beneficiary. The property
is purchased for the wife and a mortgage
for $250 taken upon it. Later on the
husband deeds the property to the wife
and at the same time at the solicitation of
the wife, borrows $250 and gives a note
for the same, which they both sign. The
wife now denies her liability and seeks
protection under the Act of 8th June,
1893, which says that she cannot become
the accohmodation indorser or surety for
another. Under the same act her powers
are so enlarged that a note given by a
married woman not appearing on its face
to be affected by any of the statutory exceptions to her power is .prima facie
valid. Oberly v. Oberly, 190 Pa. 341.
The wife alleges this note is given for a
debt of the husband, but the facts fail to
sustain this allegation. The note was
given for a pre-existing debt upon a property deeded to her. The wife was the
sole beneficiary of the loan and the not
given to secure it was valid against both
of them. In the violation of principal,
and such exists here, we look upon the
wife as the principal and the husband
.as the surety. We cannot do other than
hold that the note was given to relieve
the estate of the wife of a pre-existing
debt against it and a note so given is beyond question valid against her. Abell
v. Choffees, 15 Pa. 254; Building Ass.
v. Armwig, 32 Superior 143.
Judgment is hereby entered for the
plaintiff.
E. F. HELLER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

John Topliff bought a house. He becameindebted for the purchase money. It
cannot matter that he intended to give
this house to his wife, and that he, later,
in fact, gratuitously conveyed it to her.
He, arnd not she, was the debtor for the

purchase money. When he conveyed to
the wife he paid off the mortgage he had
given to his vendor, viz: $250. He obtained this money by a loan from Gracey,
giving Gracey a note, signed by himself
and by his wife.
The signing of the note by the wife may
have been as sole principal, the husband
being surety, or as surety, the husband being principal, or as joint principal with
her husband. She can be compelled to
pay the note, unless she signed as surety.
But what indicates that she signed as
surety? The fact that she was about to
receive a conveyance of the house is not
decisive, for the house was purchased by
the husband for a gift. to her. He was
liable to the vendor for these $250, and not
she. The attempt is to pay the vendor
by money borrowed from Gracey. As the
husband was solely indebted to the vendor,
he may well have intended to remain
solely indebted, either to Gracey, or to his
wife, if she, as co-maker, should have to
pay Gracey.
But Mrs. Topliff wanted the conveyance
made, and wanted a note, which would
not be a lien, substituted for the mortgage.
She urged her husband to make the note.
But, had she accepted the conveyance
with the mortgage upon the property, she
might herself, as owner, have possibly
found a lender on a note, and become the
principal debtor in it. As her husband
had intended a gift of the entire house, lie
had intended that his wife should be liable
for none of the purchase money. We do
not see in her suggestion that the form of
the debt should be changed, an intention
on her part or on his that she should, in
favor of the husband, assume the payment
of the $250. They may well have intended
that the husband should pay the $2.50 to
be obtained upon the note.
The important question"is, what should
(Gracey have believed as to Mrs. Topliff's
intention? If he wasjustified in inferring
from what he knew only that she was not
the borrower, but her husband, she assisting him with her credit, and she was not
in fact the borrower, Gracey could not
compel her to pay the note, for she would
be a surety. If she intended to be a surety
for her husband, but nothing gave notice
to Gracey of this intention, he could assume that she was a co-principal or the
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sole principal. But the evidence does not
assist us to discover what the facts were.
Such being the case, we think there is a
presumption that the wife's signature creates a liability. She must have intended
to assume one. Gracey must have supposed she was assuming one. We think
the burden on her to show distinctly that
she intended to become, and was known
by Gracey to intend to become, merely a
surety. For this reason the judgment is
affirmed.
HERBER vs. WILLIAMS'
EXECUTORS.
Assumpsit-Contractof suretyship defined
-. ffect of the death of the surety-iSurety's executors not liable for credit
furnished aftgr the obligor's decease.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The plaintiff sues the defendant executor upon a promise under seal made by the
deceased to the plaintiff, by which the
former guaranteed to pay for any goods
that one Brown might purchase of the
plaintiff. No goods were ever bought by
Brown from the plaintiff in pursuance of
the above promise until after the death of
the deceased and about two years after the
promise had been made. Neither Brown
nor the plaintiff knew of the death of Williams at the time of the purchase. Williams living in a town over twenty miles
distant.
MOOREHOUSE for the plaintiff.

The contract of suretyship is not as a
general rule terminated by the death of
the surety, and where the contract is a
continuing one and the contract is entire,
the estate of the surety will be liable
thereon for defaults occurring after the
death of the surety whether the contract
is made expressly binding on the executors, administrators and heirs or not.
Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, vol 8, page
1013; White's Exs. v. Commonwealth, 16
S. & R. 301; Ormsby v. Fortune, 39 Pa.
167.
The rule that the death of a person discharges his contract to render personal
services has been held not to apply where
the services are of such a character that
they can be performed just as well by his
personal representatives. Billings' Appeal, 166 Pa. 588; Machine Co. v. Rosensteel, 24 Feb. 581.
LAA.RD for the defendant.
An offer made and not accepted during

the life of the offerer is revoked by his
death and it is too late to accept after.
Phillips v. Jones, 20 Pa. 2(0; Barod's
Estate, 13 Phila. 241; Helfenstein Estate,
77 Pa. 828; Bishop on Contracts, page 331.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question to be decided in this case
is whether or not the promise under seal,
made by Williams to the plaintiff, was a
contract of suretyship.
"A contract of suretyship is not as a
general rule terminated by the death of
the surety, and where the contract is a
continuing one, and the contract is entire, the estate of the surety will be liable
thereon for defaults occurring after the
death of the surety, whether the contract
is made expressly binding on the executors, administrators and heirs or not."
A. & E. Ency. of Law, vol. 8, page 1013.
It is also held in White v. Com., 39 Pa.
167; Miner v. Graham, 24 Pa. 491, and in
many other cases, that "when the engagement of a surety is a contract and not
a bare authority, it is not usually revoked
by his death and his estate remains
liable."
In White v. Com., 39 Pa. 167, it was
held that "a contract to pay money, although it falls due after the decease of
the obligor, does survive. The contract is
not to be completed by any personal performance, but by the payment of money."
All the above statements pre-suppose a
contract from the beginning, and were it
possible in the present case to see any acceptance of the defendant's offer before
his death, the contract which would then
come into existence, would be one of
suretyship and binding on the executors
of the deceased.
A case similar to the one at bar is reported in 16 Rhode Island, 149.
The
Court in that case said, "guaranties have
been divided into two classes: one where
the consideration is entire, that is, where
it passes wholly at one time; the other
where it passes at different times. The
former are not revocable by the guarantors and are not terminated by his
death and notice of that fact. The latter
on the contrary, may be revoked as to
subsequent transactions by the guarantors, upon notice to that effect, and are determined by his death and notice of that
event."
In'the above case Coulthart v. Clbment-
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son, L. R. 52 B. Div. 42, is cited, Justice
The only effect that the presence of a
Bowen holding in that case that "notice
seal upon the promise has in Pennsylvania,
of death of the guarantors is a notice to
is to remove the necessity of an actual conterminate the guaranty and has the same
sideration. But it does not show that a
effect as a notice given in the lifetime of
consideration has passed, and when, as in
the guarantor that he would put an end
this case, there was no consideration until
after the death, the seal will not keep the
to it."
The facts in the case now before us are offer open, but it will be revoked upon
similar to thesecond proposition, as above,
death.
that is, that the consideration passes at
In the above Massachusetts case the
different times, or in other words when
Court held: "The fact that the instruthe goods are delivered, so that according
mentis underseal cannot change its nature
to the Rhode Island law, such an authoror construction. No liability existed unity can be revoked after death of party by
der it against the guarantor at the time of
giving notice of the death.
his death, but the goods for which plainBut in Jordan v. Dobbins, 122 Mass.
tiff seeks to recover, were all sold after168, it was held that "the guaranty was
wards."
revoked upon death of guarantor and his
The case of Bradbury v. Morgan, 1 H. &
executors were not liable for goods fur- C. 249, holding a contrary doctrine, has
nished upon strength of the guaranty,
been overruled.
even though notice of death had not been
Applying these principles to the case at
given."
bar, it follows that the defendant is enIn this case the Court held "an agreetitled to judgment. The guaranty is in
ment to guarantee" (which agreement was
its nature nothing more than a simple
under seal) "the payment by another of guaranty for a proposed sale
of goods.
goods to be sold in the future, not founded
PRICKETT, J.
upon any present consideration passing to
OPINION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT.
the guarantor, is a contract of a peculiar
Williams offered to become liable to Hercharacter. Until it is acted upon, it liber for the price of goods sold to Brown,
posesno obligation and creates no liability
if Herber should sell any to him. This
of the guarantor. After it is acted upon,
offer could be converted into a contract
the sale of goods upon the credit of the
only by its acceptance before it had lapsed.
guaranty is the only consideration for the
The death of Williams put an end to the
conditional promise of the guarantor to
offer. It could not be subsequently acpay for them."
"The agreement which the guarantor
cepted. Phipps v. Jones, 20 Pa. 260; Helmakes with the person receiving the
fenstein's Estate, 77 Pa. 328.
guaranty, Is not that I now become liable
Nor do we think knowledge by Herber
to you for anything, but that if you sell
of the death of Williams necessary in orgoods to a third person, I will then be- der to make acceptance ineffectual. The
come liable to pay for them if such person
contract is not made till acceptance, and a
does not. Such a guaranty is revocable
contract cannot be made with a non-existby the guarantor at any time before it is
ent person even though he once existed.
This effect of the death of the offerer, is
acted upon."
"Such being the nature of a guaranty,
the unavoidable result of the definition of
the death of the party operates as a revoa contract.
cation of it and the person holding it canThe offer might conceivably have been
not recover against his executor or adminaccepted by the actual sale of goods to
istrator for goods sold after the death."
Brown, in consequence of, and in reliance
"Death terminates the power of the
upon, Williams' offer, but, according to
deceased to act and revokes any authority
several cases in Pennsylvania, no contract
or license he may have given, if it has not
is made under such an offer as we have
been executed or acted upon. His estate
before us, until the acceptance is notified
is not held for a liability which is created
to the offerer. Of guarantors of the class
after his death, by the exercise of a power
to which Williams belonged, it is said
or authority which he might at any time
"Upon every principle therefore applicable
revoke."
to such a case [the judge evidently means
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upon one principle applicable to the case]
they were entitled to notice of acceptance
before any liability arose." Cf. the cases
cited in the opinion and Evans v. McCormick, 167 Pa. 247. It would be quite difficult to understand how, after the death of
Williams, a liability of his should come
into existence.
The offer was under seal, and there are
a few cases which hold that such an offer
cannot be withdrawn, and may therefore
be accepted at any time. Clark, Cont., 47.
We are not aware that this principle has
been accepted in this State, nor do we appreciate the reasons adduced for support
of it. It ought surely to be understood
that even an offer under seal would need
to be accepted within a reasonable time,
unlessa time for acceptance were specified;
and that even a sealed offer could not be
accepted after the offerer was dead, because the formation of a contract pre-supposes the co-existence and concurtence of
two minds; and the necessity of this coexistence is inherent in the conception of
a contract. It would strike the unsophisticated intellect as odd, to affirm that
where a man made under seal an offer, e. g.
to sell a house, the offeree might deliberate 10 or 20 years, and then surprise the
offerer with an acceptance; or that, the
the offeree having done nothing towards
acceptance, the offerer could not expressly
withdraw the offer. We shall hold, until
better advised, that Williams' sealed offer
could be withdrawn by him before acceptance, and that his death was a withdrawal
of it, though unknown to Herber.
The judgment of the learned court below
is affirmed.

WILLIAM CARTER vs. AMOS
SHELDON.
Gift-Deposit in savingsbank- Trut-ntent-vidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Sarah Carter, aunt of William, kept a
deposit account in the F. Bank. She likewise opened another in the name "Sarah
Carter, agent for William Carter." This
she did without any understanding with
William. There were no dealings between
them. Deposits as agent were made from

time to time to the extent of $2,700. Sarah

Carter withdrew therefrom by checks,
sums aggregating $1,700, which she spent
in gifts of various sorts to William.
She declared to three persons that she
had moneys in the F. Bank for William,
but to at least as many persons she denied
this when questioned. At her death William Carter claimed the money as a gift to
him. It waspaid by the bankto Sheldon,
her administrator.
M. S. KAUFMAN for plaintiff.
The deposit of money in a savings bank
by one person to the credit of another, or
in his own name in trust foranother, where
the circumstances clearly show that a gift
was intended, and are such as to raise a
presumption that the donee has accepted
the gift, is sufficient to pass the title to the
deposit to the donee or to create an enforceable trust in his favor. Gaffney's Estate,
146 Pa. 49. Cites also Smith's" Estate, 144
Pa. 428; Crawford's Appeal, 61 Pa. 52;
Parker's Estate, 34 W. N. C. 376; Meregan
v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321; Martin v. Funk,
75 N. Y. 134; Scott v. Bank, 140 Mass. 157.
HENNECKE for defendant.
Mere declarations of the depositor that
he has given the money deposited to another are insufficient to establish a gift,
without the delivery of the bank-book to
the donee. Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, vol.
14, p. 1030; Hoar v. Hoar, 5 Redf. (N. Y.)
637; Polley v. Hicks, 58 Ohio, 218; Watson v. Watson, 69 N. N. 243; Kimball v.
Leland, 110 Mass. 325.
To constitute a gift there must be an intention expressed in words or acts. William's Appeal, 106 Pa. 116; Bond v. Bunting, 78Pa. 210; Scott v. Lauman, 104 Pa.
593; and an acceptance by the donee.
Broderick v. Savings Bank, 109 Mass. 149.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action of assumpsit to determine the ownership of certain moneys deposited in the F. Bank by Sarah Carter,
during her lifetime, which are now in the
hands of her administrator. The plaintiff
claims this money as a gift to him.
The owner of personal property may
make a gift of it direct to the donee, or he
may impress upon it a trust for the benefit
of the donee. Whether a gift or a trust is
intended, if the transaction still remains
imperfect, it cannot be enforced. It has
been held that the expression of a mere intention to create a trust, without more, is
insufficient; like a promise to give, it will
not be enforced. Helfenstein's Estate, 77
Pa. 328; Smith's Estate, 144 Pa. 428.
But if it appears that the intention of
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the donor was to adopt either one of these
methods of disposition, the court will not
resort to the other for the purpose of carrying it into effect. And what is clearly intended as a voluntary assignment or gift,
but is imperfect as such, cannot be treated
-isa declaration of trust.
"If this were so, an expression of present
gift would In all cases amount to a declaration of trust, and any imperfectgift might
be made effectual simply by converting it
intoa trust." Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio,
108.
And in order to create a trust there must
be the expression of an intention, not to
create a present gift but to become a trustee. See Long's Appeal, 86 Pa. 196. And a
gift can only be effectual after the intention
to make it has been accompanied by delivery of possession or some equivalent act;
otherwise the transaction is not a gift, but
merely a contract. But if a trust is intended, it will be equally valid whether
the donor transfer the title to the trustee,
or declare that he holds the property for
the purposes of the trust. Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 210; Crawford's Appeal, 61
Pa. 52; Bispham's Eq. 109.
It is clear that a gift was not in contemplation, and the only question is whether
or not a complete and valid trust was created.
The owner of property may create in
himself a voluntary trust in respect thereto by any act or declaration which unequivocally shows that he holds such property in trust for the beneficiary, and it is
not necessary that the beneficiary should
know of or assent to such trust. Gaffney's
Estate, 146 Pa. 49; Crawford's Appeal, 61
Pa. 52; Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321;
Conn. River Savings Bank v. Albee, 64
Vt. 571.
Thus no certain form of declaration is
required to create a trust, but the intention must be plainly manifest, "not declarations derived from loose and equivocal
exnressions made at different times."
Sharpless v. Welsh, 4 Dall. 261 ; Sheet's
Estate, 52 Pa. 266.
Even though a gift, in its proper legal
acceptation, was not contemplated by
Sarah Carter, it is plain that her purpose
was to vest the equitable ownership of
this money in her nephew and to apply it
to his benefit.
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The declarations and subsequent acts
furnish controvertible proofs of her intention to so use the funds, thus deposited,
solely for the benefit of her nephew.
It appears that she had an individual
account as well as an account,-"Sarah
Carter, agent for Win. Carter," with the
F. Bank, and from that fact it was argued
that she manifested an intention of setting
aside these deposits for the sole benefit of
her nephew. This is further strengthened
by the fact that the sums, aggregating
$1,700, which she withdrew from this fund,
she spent in gifts to William, and there is
no evidence to show the contrary intention or even to establish a motive for mnaking a deposit "as agent" other than for
this purpose.
We think a fair construction of the statement of the case finds such was her intention. This establishes the trust.
The testimony of the witnesses, showing
that Sarah Carter, upon being questioned
had denied she had money in bank for
her nepliev, after the trust had been created should not have been admitted. No
such declarations made after the creation
of the trust could have any legitimate effect on it. Conn. River Savings Bank v.
Albee, 64 Vt. 571; Ray v. Simmons, 11 R.
1. 266; Bispham's Eq. 105, and in Merigan
v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, and Scott v.
Berkshire Co. Savings Bank, 140 Mass.
157, it has been held that the subsequent
declarations of the depositor against the
interests of the cestui que trust were not
competent to invalidate the trust.
The testimony of those witnesses in respect to the declarations of Sarah Carter
that she had moneys in the F. Bank for
William were properly admitted. Perry
Tr. 77, 147. Bispham's Eq. 65, and cases
cited. They are also admissible on the
ground that "the declarations of deceased
persons made against their interests or
right, are admissible against those who
claim in the interest or right of such deceased persons." Wheeler v. Wheeler's
Estate, 47 Vt. 637; 1 Greenl. Ev. 189.
This case is not distinguishable from
Gaffney's Estate, supra. In that case,
Chief Justice Paxson said: "Granted that
there was no direct evidence of a trust,
this appears upon the face of the bankbook. An argument was based upon the
allegation that he had never delivered the
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bank-book to Polly McKim. This, however, was not necessary, as it would have
been in the case of a gift inter sese. We
have, then, the case of a deposit on the
books of the bank of the sum of money in
the name of Hugh Gaffney, trustee for
Polly McKim. This makes out, at least,
aprimafaciecase for the appellant."
There is no evidence to show that Sarah
Carter had made the deposit for any other
purpcse than that disclosed by the books
of the bank.
It has been held that the retention of
the pass-book by the depositor is not, under
the circumstances here, decisive against
the validity of the trust. Conn. River
Say. Bank supra (1892); Atkinson's Petition, 16 R. 1. 413 (1890) ; Nlerigan v. McGonigle supra, (1903).
Without anything disclosing a contrary
intention, it will be presumed that she
retained the book as trustee and not in her
individual capacity. In this case it seems
that it was necessary that the depositor
retain the pass-book, so that the various
sums might from time to time be entered
in it.
Completeness of the trust is to be judged
of, not only by what Mrs. Carter said, but
by what she did.
We are of the opinion that a trust is
fully established, therefore judgment for
the plaintiff.
REESER, J
OPINION OF THE SUPREIE COURT.

The $1,000 in dispute were once the property of Sarah Carter. They are claimed
by William Carter, her nephew. He does
not pretend to have given any consideration for them, or to have made any contract respecting them, with his aunt. If
they are his, therefore, they are his by a

gift.
They were not put into his control during her life. On the contrary, he was not
aware of her act, under which he now,
since her decease, pretends to be the owner. Of a gift involving the transfer of possession from donor to donee, there is no
evidence.
But a gift may be made by a declaration
of trust. Such declaration may affect
land, or chattels, or choses in action, such
as bank deposits. Merigan v. McGonigle,
205 Pa. 321 ; Gaffney's Estate, 146 Pa. 49;

shares of stock in a corporation-Roberts'
Appeal,.85 Pa. 84.
Is there sufficient evidence of such a declaration of trust? It is not necessary that
the donee or beneficiary should be apprised of it, (cases supra). The trust may begin and become irrevocable without his
knowledge. The money was Miss Carter's.
She put it in the bank, receiving credit for
it as "agent" for William. What could
she have meant by this? He had not constituted her agent. She elected to be treated as such by the bank, and, we must assume, by him. Having formally declared
that the deposit was intended by her for(
him, and that she should control it only
as his "agent", she may well be inferred
to have intended to make him the owner
from the moment the deposits were made.
In her withdrawals from time to time,
by checks, no evidence overcoming the
hypothesis of trust can be descried. The
money withdrawn was spent for the declared donee. The declarations made after
the deposits were made, that she had no
moneys on deposit for William, whether
receivable in evidence or not, are insufficient to disprove the intent. To whom
and on what occasion they were made, we
know not. She was not bound to avow
the truth, on pain of divesting an interest
that had already passed to her nephew.
The declaration that she had moneys on
deposit for her nephew, are slightly corroborative of the interpretation of the act
of making the deposit as agent for him.
The cases cited by the learned court below in its very lucid and satisfactory opinion, amply vindicate the conclusion to
which it has come.
As Sheldon, the administrator, has received the money, which was no part of
Miss Carter's estate, he is liable in assumpsit to the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.
SAMUEL LEIBY vs. WILLIAM
HOLMES.
Rule in Shelly's Case-Constructionof devise-Effect of words of distributivemodification and superaddedlimitations.
STATEIENT OF THE CASE.

Adam Leiby demised his farm "to my
son Samuel [the plaintiff] for his life, and
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after his death to his children or issue,
share and share alike, and not by representation, and their heirs." Samuel has
contracted to convey to Holmes the premises, in fee, but Holmes denying his power
to convey a fee, declines to pay the purchase money. Assumpsit.
HASSERT for plaintiff.
The remainder being to a class, i. e., to the
heirs of such of his children as should survive him (Leiby), the rule in Shelly's case
operated. Challis on Real Property, page
112. An estate tail was created, which by
the Act of April 29, 1855, was converted
into a fee simple. Cited also 36 L. R. A.
186.
REESER for defendant.
The words "children or issue" are words
of purchase. Hill v. Hill, 74 Pa. 173; Oyster v. Knull, 137 Pa. 448; Pierce v. Hubbard, 152 Pa. 18.
When the word "issue" is intended to
have a less extended meaning, and to be
applied only to children or to descendants
of a particular class or at a particular time,
it is to be construed as a word of purchase
and not of limitation, in order to effectuate
the intention of the testator, and the rule
in Shelly's Case does not operate. Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 9; Kay v. Scates, Id.
70; Taylor v. Taylor, ]3 P. F. S. 481;
Kleppner v. Laverty, 20 P. F. S. 481.
Cited also Findlay v. Riddle, 3 Binn. 139;
Stump v. Findlay, 2 Rawle, 168; Robins
v. Quinliven, 79 Pa. 335; Piper v. Locke,
205 Pa. 616.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Thecontention on the part of the defendant is that the plaintiff has only a life estate in the premises, and is not entitled
to recover because he has not and cannot
tender a good, sufficient and marketable
title. If this title is doubtful, or if it is not
marketable, plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and whether he has such a title depends upon the estate devised by plaintiff's testator.
Was the life estate enlarged and converted into an estate tail, or an estate in fee
simple.under the Act of April 27, 1855?
This depends upon the objects of the gift
and the character in which they were intended to take. If the testator by the
words "children or issue" meant "heirs of
the body" of his son, then under the rule
in Shelly's Case tb- remainder vested in
him as devisee for life, and he took the
whole estate as tenant in tail. But, if by
the words "children or issue" he meant

children or issue living at the death of the
devisee, and intended that they should
become the root of a new succession and
take by purchase and not by descent as
heirs of their father, then he took only a
life estate. It is well settled that the word
"issue" in a will, primafacie, (standing
alone), means "heirs of the body," and in
the absence of explanatory words showing
that it was used in a restricted sense, is to
be construed as a word of limitation. But
if there be on the face of the will sufficient
to show that the word was intended to
have a less extended meaning, and to be
applied only to children or to descendants
of a particular class or at a particular time,
it is to be construed as a word of purchase
and not of limitation in order to effectuate
the intention of the testator. Slater v. Dangerfield, 15 Mees. & Wels. 263; Guthrie's
Appeal, 37 Pa. 9; Kay v. Scates, Id. 70;
Taylor v. Taylor, 13 P. F. S. 481 ; Kleppner v. Laverty, 20 P. F. S. 481. What then
is there in this will to show that by "children or issue" heirs of the body were intended?
The remainder is not to the
"heirs" or "heirs of the body" of the tenant for life, but to his "children or issue"they are to take "share and share alike
and not by representation," and it is to
them and "their heirs." There is also no
devise over in case of failure of "children
or issue." The gift is accompanied both
by words of distributive modification and
by superadded words of limitation. Such
provisions are inconsistent with the children or issue taking as heirs in tail of their
father, the devisee of the lire estate. Smith,
in his treatise on Executory Interests, pp.
237-242 inc., in stating the cases in which
the rule in Shelly's Case will not be applied, says: "The reported cases exhibit
six ways at least in which the word 'heir'
or 'heirs' has been indirectly explained,
and divested of its usual meaning," (that
is, converted into a word of purchase);
among these ways he enumerates the following: "By prescribing for the heirs,
general or special, a distributive mode of
taking, and also superadded words of limitation, as to A for life, remainder to the
heirs of his body, as well females as males,
as tenants in common (or share and share
alike, or without any respect to be had in
regard to seniority of age, or priority of
birth), and their heirs and assigns. The
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mere addition of words of distributive
modification would be equivocal, for the
grantor might have erroneously supposed
that the heirs might take in that character, and yet in a paritive mode, but the
engrafting of superadded words of limitation, besides the words of distributive modification, shows clearly that he meant the
first named heirs, the children of the ancestor, who are sometimes so named as
having the capacity of becoming heirs of
the ancestor, either in succession, if male,
or contemporaneously, if females." For
this he cites numerous ancient and modern authorities. If this be so when the
remainder is limited to "heirs" by that
description, with greater reason must it be
the rule where the remainder is given to
"children or issue" where there is no such
presumption that the donor intended that
they should take by descent arising from
his use of apt words of limitation. This
principle is recognized in the cases of Findlay v. Riddle, 3 Binn. 139; Stump v. Findlay, 2 Rawle, 168; Abbott v. Jenkins, 10
S. & R. 296; Chew's Appeal, 37 Pa. 27;
Grimes v. Shirk, 169 Pa. 74, and O'Rourke
v. Sheuvin, 156 Pa. 290. In Robins v.
Quinliven, 79 Pa. 335, the Court says:
"Besides, the gift of the remainder is not
to the issue alone, but to the issue and
their heirs forever, in the proportions to
which they would be entitled under the
intestate laws of Pennsylvania, respectively, that is to say, in equal shares as tenants in common. The limitation to the
heirs general of the issue with superadded
words of distributive modification, clearly
shows that by "issue" the testator meant
children, and intended that they should
take the remainder as purchasers and not
as heirs by descent. See also Walker v.
Milligan, 45 Pa. 180.
The Court is conscious of the fact that
there are decisions contrary to the doetrines above set forth, butas Gibson, C. J.,
remarks in Hilemay v. Bouslaugh, 13 Pa.
351, "it (the rule in Shelly's Case) operates only on the intention, when it has
been ascertained, not on the meaning of
the words used to express it. The ascertainment is left to the ordinary rules of
construction peculiar to wills; but when
the intention is thus ascertained, if found
to be within the rule, there is but one way,
it admits not of exceptions. It is the ap-

plication of those ordinary rules, sometimes controlling the meaning on weak
and inconclusive grounds, and not to the
nature of the particular rule, that the discrepance of the decisions is attributable."
The Court, therefore, construing this
will favorable to the intent of the testator
and agreeable to common understanding,
is of the opinion that the devisee in the
will has a life estate only, and having a
life estate cannot convey a title in fee simple, and therefore directs judgment to be
entered for defendant.
HEDGES,

J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Had the gift over after the life of the testator's son Samuel, been to "his children
or issue," we should be warranted in holding that children was equivalent to issue,
or that the gift was to children or the issue
of children, and under either interpretation, the rule in Shelly's Case would be
applicable. If children were another-word
for issue its applicability would be unquestioned. Issue would mean progeny of all
generations. If issue meant the Issue of
children, it would have imported as readily the issue of all generations, as it would
have, had issue been the issue of the life
tenant. Pifer v. Locke, 205 Pa. 615; (Of.
Simpson v. Reed, 205 Pa. 53).
But, the will directs that the children or
issue shall take "share and share alike and
not by representation." This can have but
one meaning. Those who take after Samuel are to take equal shares. They are
children, or the issue of dead children.
And the issue of a dead child are not to
take simply what would have been, had he
survived, the share of the child, but each
of them is to take as much as any one of
the surviving children. If Samuel had
three sons, one of whom died before him,
leaving four sons, these four grandsons and
the surviving two sons of the testator,
would take each one-sixth. It is evident
then, that the land is not to pass from
Samuel precisely as it would pass, were he
seized in fee, under the intestate law, but
on a widely different plan.
The gift is to the children or issue, and
their heirs. Conjoined with the other
indicia, this shows that the persons designated by "children or issue" are intended
to receive a fee simple, and that they ob-
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tain it, not by inheritance from Samuel,
but by gift, as remaindermen, from the
testator.
We are satisfied with the conclusion
reached by the learned Court below. Samuel acquired a life estate only, and can convey no more.
Judgment affirmed.
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tion was between the same parties, therefore the evidence is not admissible. Greenleaf on Evidence, page 2-59 ; Brown v. Com.
73 Pa. 321.
Conceding the correctness of the transcription, there is no offer to verify the
original stenographic notes, and this is essential before their admissibility. Miles
v. O'Hara, 4 Binney, 111; Livingston v.
Cox, 8 S. & R. 62; Edwards v. Gimbel,
202 Pa. 37; Smith v. Hine, 179 Pa.-207.

WM. HALLAWAY vs. CHAS.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

LITTLE.

The notes of testimony given in a former
trial are admissible in evidence when the
witness giving the testimony has died or
has been prevented by illness from attending court. Greenleaf on Evidence, page
285.
In 76 Pa. 373, the court held that the testimony of a witness, formerly taken in the
same cause, may be read in evidence on
showing that he is sick and unable to attend, insane, or in such a state of senility
as to have lost his memory. Although
this is a principle of the law of evidence of
admitting the notes of testimony, nevertheless, the court said in 144 Pa. 126, that
the deposition of a witness was always subject to the lawful discretion of the trial
judge.
Conceding that the witness was unable
to give his testimony, and also the correctness of the transcription by the typewriter,
nevertheless, there is no offer made to
authenticate the original phonographic
notes, and we do not think the testimony
is admissible unless it has been verified.
What the witness testified may be proved
by any person who will swear from his own
memory, or by notes taken by any person
who will swear to their accuracy. The
offer of the mere notes themselves, whether
purporting to be by a stenographer, or only
by an attorney or clerk, is the offer of a
hearsay report of the testimony, and is improper. Greenleaf on Evidence, page 288.
The son of Frumler could testify as to the
manner of transcription of the notes of testimony, but he makes no offer to testify as
to-their original accuracy.
In 179 Pa. 207, where the official stenographer of the court was allowed to read
his notes of the testimony of a witness
taken at a former trial of the same issue,
on the ground that they were a deposition,
they were the shorthand notes of the stenographer made during the examination of
a witness, but the court held they were

Exception to admissibility of evidenceAdmissibilityof stenoqraphicnotes-Act
of May 23, 1887.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In a former trial the testimony of
Jacob Frumler had been taken for Hal]away. A new trial was awarded. Meantime Frumler, who was 79 years old, had
grown very feeble and his memory had
suddenly failed him. Phonographic notes
of his testimony had been taken byan unofficial person, a learner of phonography,
who had afterwards for his own practice,
had his notes transcribed by a typewriter,
making three copies simultaneously. He
had since lost the phonographic notes and
had himself become insane. His son had
made the typewritten copies, he translating to him the phonography. After the
copies were made, Frumler took one of
them and read it to his son, who at the
slime time read the phonograpbic notes.
One of these copies, with the testimony of
Frumler's son as to the manner of transcription, was offered as a substitute for
Frumler's present testimony. The court
rejected the evidence.
WOLFE for the plaintiff in error.
The notes of counsel showing that a deceased witness testified on a former trial
between the same parties, touching the
same subject matter, has been admitted in
Pennsylvania. 27 Pa. 30; 17 S. & R. 409;
10 S. & R. 14; 11 S. & R. 149.
What.the deceased witness testified may
be proven by any person who will swear
from his own memory or by notes taken
by any person who will swear to their accuracy. 17 S. & R. 409; 10 S. & R. 78.
The term "deceased witness" may mean
absent witnesses or witnesses who cannot
be summoned. 76 Pa. 359; 91 Pa. 168; 3
Casey, 50.
TYLER for the defendant in error.
It does not appear that the former ac-
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not a deposition, and as the stenographer
was not sworn they were not properly
proven notes of the examination as required by the Act of 1887.
In 96 Pa. 48, the court held that the testimony of a witness formerly taken in the
same cause can be read in evidence by reproducing the testimqny, or the notes of
the testimony, the accuracy of which has
first been shown.
In Miles v. O'Hara, 4 Binney 108, the
court held, if a bystander who had heard
the evidence given ten years before, would
attempt to state upon oath the testimony
given, he might be received for that purpose, but it must have been under the sanction of an oath or affirmation, for without
this essential requisite there can be no evidence in legal acceptation.
To admit in evidence the notes of the
testimony of Frumler without any verification, would be to open wide the door to
fraud and injustice. Therefore we think
they were properly rejected.
SIPES, J.
OPIN!IN OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The ninth section of the Act of May 23,
1887, P. L. 158, enacts that when any person has been examined as a witness in any
civil proceeding, if such witness becomes
incompetent to testify for any legally sufficient reason, properly proven notes of the
examination of such witness shall be competent evidence in any civil issue which
may exist at the time of his examination.
For the purpose of contradicting a witness,
the testimony given by him in a former
proceeding may be orally proved.
It is not necessary to consider whether,

as it seems to do, this act makes it impossible to prove the former testimony by the
oral evidence of those who heard it. Sec.
6, P. & L. Dig. 9784. The loss of the witness' memory from age and disease is a
legally sufficient reason for receiving his
former testimony. Emig v. Diehl, 76 Pa.
359; Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108.
The notes usable to establish the former
testimony, which is not employed for the
purpose of contradiction, must be "properly proven." The accuracy, both of the
original notes and of the transcription
from them, must be established. It may
be that the accuracy of the transcription
was, in the case before us, adequately
proven. The reporter had his notes transcribed by a typewriter. He read his notes
to the typewriter. After the copy was
made, the reporter took the copy and read
it aloud, while the typewriter read the
original phonographic notes.
This, we
think, justified the assumption by the
court and jury of the accuracy of the copy;
the typewriter swearing to the correspondence of what he wrote with what was read,
and to the correspondence of the notes, as
read by him, with the transcript as read
aloud by the phonographer.
But, as the learned Court of Common
Pleas points out, there is in this no evidence
that the primary notes themselves corresponded with what the witness said. They
may have corresponded and probably did
correspond, but of this correspondence
there is no legal proof. Smith v. Hine,
179 Pa. 203; Miles v. O'Hara, 4 Binn. 108;
Livingston v. Cox, 8 W. & S. 61.
Judgment affirmed.

